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THE CABLE SECRETARIAT

1952 - 1966

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November

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**THE CABLE SECRETARIAT  
1952-1966**

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*by*

[Redacted]

*Revised and Rewritten*

*by*

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]  
Director of Communications  
Directorate of Management  
and Services  
November 1973

**HISTORICAL STAFF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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Foreword

This history of the CIA Cable Secretariat from 1952 through 1966 is a condensation of an original four-volume draft completed in 1971. Because that draft is preserved in the archives of the CIA Historical Staff\* and is available to Agency personnel who may be interested in the detailed records of the Cable Secretariat, this condensation does not include appendix material other than source references.

The original four-volume draft of the history of the Secretariat was written by [REDACTED] and a later two-volume version was written by

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[REDACTED]  
This one-volume condensation was written by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of the CIA Historical Staff, who was at no time a member of the staff of the Secretariat and thus relied wholly on the work done by [REDACTED] and on the documents included as attachments in the first draft.

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\* See HS/HC-875.

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The Cable Secretariat

1952 - 1966

I. Origin and Antecedents

A. Predecessors of the Cable Secretariat

The history of the CIA Cable Secretariat-Message Center actually begins on 15 July 1952, some five years after the Agency was activated in September 1947. During that five-year period, of course, there was a cable-processing activity in the Agency, but it was closely patterned after those developed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from June 1942 to October 1945, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department from October 1945 to January 1946,\* and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) from January 1946 to September 1947. Although the July 1952 reorganization of the cable-handling procedure in the Agency brought about some major changes,

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\* Although SSU was not officially terminated until 11 April 1947, 1/ the SSU cable processing unit was transferred to CIG upon the activation of CIG on 22 January 1946. 2/ For serially numbered source references, see the Appendix.

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the basic methods and techniques practiced by the predecessor cable units were retained -- with, of course, modifications. It is appropriate, then, that a brief description of the OSS, SSU, CIG, and early CIA cable-processing units be given here.

1. The OSS Secretariat and Message Center

OSS headquarters was a small group of buildings at 2430 E Street NW in Washington. The office of the Director, General William J. Donovan, was on the first floor of the Administration Building, one of the smaller of the group. The Cable Secretariat, the central point of authority for the processing and distribution of OSS cables, was on the second floor, just above the Director's office. The Secretariat was staffed by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The entire basement of the building, below the first-floor offices of the Director and his staff, was occupied by the Message Center.

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Action responsibility for cables was assigned by the Message Center to appropriate headquarters units, and information copies were sent to other units in accordance with guidelines and distribution patterns determined by the Secretariat for each type

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of cable. Distribution was simple during the early stages of OSS development; information copies were furnished only to the Director, the Secretariat, the Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch, and a number of senior officers on the Director's staff. All distribution copies of incoming cables were plain-text paraphrases of the decoded messages. The paraphrases were written and typed by the code clerks, a procedure that was quite practicable as long as the volume of incoming cables was small.

By the end of 1942, however, cable traffic had increased to the point where [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED], chief of the Message Center operations, had to establish a typing section and specialized cipher sections. By early 1943, message centers had been established in [REDACTED] and elsewhere in the Mediterranean area. By the end of 1943 there were 75 administrative and traffic-handling people in the Headquarters Message Center.

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In addition to OSS cable traffic the headquarters Message Center reproduced and distributed Army, Navy, and State Department cables that were of intelligence interest to OSS. In late 1942 the Message Center was processing about 1,000 classified cables a month -- OSS, Army, Navy, and State cables; by late 1944 the volume had increased to more than 4,000 a month. In addition, the Center transmitted official OSS unclassified telegrams to commercial telegraph companies -- about 900 a month in late 1942 and more than 2,000 a month in early 1945.

2. The SSU Secretariat and Message Center

In October 1945 OSS was terminated, and that part of it that had been concerned with clandestine activities was transferred to the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit.\* 3/ [redacted]

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[redacted], who had been Donovan's deputy in OSS, assumed command of the unit. At the same time, Lieutenant (jg) [redacted], was named chief of the SSU Secretariat, which occupied the same Administration Building quarters as had the OSS.

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\* There was also an intelligence research unit in OSS; although it did not remain intact after the termination of OSS, many of its personnel were placed in the State Department, from whence they later transferred to CIA.

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Secretariat. 4/ In early November 1945 the Secretariat was divided into two sections -- a Registry Section, which remained in the Administration Building, and a Cable Control Section, which was housed in South Building next to the Message Center, which had moved there from its crowded quarters in the basement of the Administration Building. 5/

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a senior Secretariat officer, was assigned as chief of the Cable Control Section, which was charged with the responsibility for typing, reproduction, and distribution of copies of SSU cables -- a job that formerly had been done by the Message Center. 6/

Distribution patterns and cable addressing procedures remained much the same as those OSS had used. The Cable Control Section furnished copies of all cables to the Director, to Staff II (Operations), to the SI and X-2 offices, and -- when appropriate -- to the Operations Auxiliary Branch and the Personnel and Services Branches. 7/ In February 1946, however, the old OSS procedure of addressing cables by names of individuals or branches was discontinued, and a new system of addressee/addressor five-letter indicators was used to identify the originator and

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the action unit at headquarters. At the same time a new method of showing the authority by which a cable was sent was introduced\*; all cables to overseas missions bore the words "SIGNED: [ ]" and all cables from the field showed in like manner the name of the chief of mission as the signer -- regardless of the actual originator of the cable. 8/

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In September 1945 [ ] by that time a Major, left the Army and his job as chief of the OSS Message Center and returned to private law practice.

At about the same time [ ]

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returned from the OSS mission [ ] was

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assigned as chief of the Center. By the time [ ]

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reported for that duty -- in October 1945 -- the OSS Message Center had become the SSU Message Center and had been relocated in South Building in the west end of the third floor. In the spring of 1946 [ ]

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[ ] of message centers in the Mediterranean area during the war, became deputy chief of the Center.

\* These changes are noted here because -- with modifications -- they carried over to become elements in the CIA cable-handling procedures.

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Although the establishment of the Cable Control Section of the Cable Secretariat had relieved the Message Center of the typing, reproduction, and distribution chores, the other functions of the Center continued much as they had been under OSS. As noted above, there was a change in the addressee/addressor identification technique in February 1946, and by that time the paraphrasing step in cable processing had been completely eliminated,\* but essentially the Message Center procedures remained the same. There was, however, a new problem that plagued the Center -- transmission garbles. In February 1946\*\*

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[redacted] at that time Acting Chief of the Communications Branch, reported to [redacted]

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The processing of traffic, particularly in Washington, was and will continue to be adversely affected by the fact that SSU traffic is handled by carriers whose facilities are not only handicapped by shortage of personnel

\* Actually, paraphrasing was eliminated for the most part by the OSS Center in the fall of 1944 when a secure cipher system was developed. 9/

\*\* Although the Central Intelligence Group was established by Presidential Directive in January 1946 and a Director of Central Intelligence was appointed, SSU continued to exist as a War Department unit until April 1947; most of its activities, however, were absorbed by CIG in July 1946. 10/

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but also by the use of inexperienced replacements. In fact, the communication systems of the Federal Government carrying SSU traffic as a part of their over-all traffic have reverted to routine "peace-time" operating principles, which principles are governed by economy in personnel and funds rather than efficiency and security. Furthermore, in this post-hostilities phase, intelligence traffic as such is not recognized as having any precedence over any other traffic and therefore is subject to all delays, insecurities, and general slowing-down of official U.S. peace-time communications. The messages, while encyphered in SSU systems and processed by SSU Message Centers, are therefore in the majority of instances extremely garbled by poor transmission and sloppy terminal handling, which results in substantial delays in the code rooms. 11/

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[ ] succeeded [ ] as  
Director of SSU on 4 April 1946; [ ] had served as  
Executive Officer since the establishment of SSU in  
October 1945. 12/ By June 1946 it had become ap-  
parent that SSU was to become a component of the  
newly established CIG; and on 1 July, in anticipation  
of that change, the Message Center was assigned the  
responsibilities of the Cable Control Section of the  
SSU Cable Secretariat -- a return to the OSS cable-  
processing pattern. To facilitate the change, on  
27 June 1946 a complete revision of SSU cable procedures  
had been issued. 13/

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B. Developments in CIG and CIA, 1946-1952

Although the 1946-1952 period bridges both the life span of CIG and the first five years of CIA, there was a continuity of development in cable handling that can best be described without separation. Not until August 1952 was the pattern changed in any major way -- a change that re-created, so to speak, a Cable Secretariat, a unit that did not exist as such during the 1946-1952 period.

1. Organizational Development

On 11 July 1946 CIG activated the Office of Special Operations (OSO), a component designed to conduct CIG's clandestine activities. At that time the former SSU Communications Branch and the Message Center were absorbed intact by OSO and became components of the Special Support Division, which was under the Executive for the Assistant Director, OSO (ADSO). 14/

In 1947 CIA reorganized OSO, and the Communications Branch became the Communications Section, one of six divisions under the Chief of Administration and Services (CAS), who reported to the Executive Secretary for the ADSO -- referred to as the

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OSO Executive. 15/ On 1 January 1949 the Communications Branch, re-named the Communications Division, was moved from the office of the CAS and placed under the direct supervision of the Office of the ADSO. 16/ The DCI removed the Communications Division from OSO in July 1951 and established it as the Office of Communications (OC) under the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). 17/ The next change, as noted in some detail later, came in August 1952, when the DCI removed the Office of Communications from the DDP and placed it under his own command. 18/

## 2. The Message Center

During the early period of the development of OSO -- from July 1946 to September 1947 as a CIG component and then to September 1949 as a CIA component -- the Message Center had few cable processing problems. The procedures established by SSU in June 1946 were effective in controlling cable traffic between OSO headquarters and the seven OSO foreign branches. By September 1949, however, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) had been established to handle covert paramilitary operations and had begun to set up overseas missions -- many of them in the

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same locations where OSO branches had already been established. The responsibility for OPC cable traffic was assigned to the Message Center, and life became complicated. Not only did the total volume of cable traffic more than double, but also new designations had to be devised to distinguish between OSO and OPC cables and to indicate OPC addressee/addressor identities.

Fortunately for the Message Center it was spared the chore of the distribution of OPC cables. The OPC organization was so complicated and OPC operations were so tightly compartmented that OPC decided to do its own distribution. Within the OPC Registry there was established a cable unit. The Message Center sent to that unit nine copies of all OPC cables, and a staff of cable analysts within the unit determined the internal OPC distribution of the copies. It soon developed, however, that many of the OPC operations overseas were of vital concern to OSO, and it was necessary to develop an indicator that would be applied to cables of mutual OSO-OPC interest. Such an indicator was devised -- , but it was left to the Message Center to determine whether OSO or OPC

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should be assigned the action responsibility on a given cable. This problem continued until January 1952, when OSO and OPC were merged to form the Clandestine Services. 19/

In the meantime the Message Center expanded rapidly. In May 1948 it was moved from South Building to Temporary Building L, and its name was changed to the CIA Signal Center. At that time it was assigned the additional responsibility of enciphering, deciphering, and transmitting classified telegrams from and to the field offices of the

[redacted] Office of Operations (OO/C).

The first of these field offices, [redacted]

[redacted] 20/ had been activated by CIG in January 1947, and soon thereafter field offices were established in [redacted]

The already heavy load of the Signal Center increased more than two-fold after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and by the summer of 1952 the Processing Branch of the Center was typing, reproducing, and distributing more than 12,000 cables a month. With little more than half of its T/O filled, the branch was always heavily backlogged; [redacted]

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people in the branch were barely enough to cover an extended day that began at 0600 hours and continued until 1700 hours. This was the situation that the CIA Cable Secretariat inherited when it was established in August 1952.

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II. Establishment of the Secretariat,  
1952 - 1953

A. General Smith Acts

By the beginning of July 1952 General Walter B. Smith had been in the DCI position about 21 months. During that time he had become increasingly dissatisfied with cable distribution procedures in the Agency. His Executive Assistant at the time, [ ]

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[ ] recalls that on one occasion during the first few days in July he tried to explain to Smith that because there were thousands of incoming cables each month only those that the DDP, the ADSO, and the ADPC decided that the DCI should see were brought to his attention.

Apparently this did not satisfy Smith. He said, "what we need is a Cable secretariat as I had in SHAEF -- there ought to be someone responsible to me, through you, who will read all cable traffic and select for me those cables he thinks I should see." Smith then

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\* This account is based on an informal memo written by [ ] in January 1971. 22/ The direct quotations are given here as they appeared in the memo.

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25X1 picked up from his desk a group of cables that had been addressed to the DDP and other officials and told [ ] that it was not proper for cables to be addressed to his deputies, that cables should be addressed to the Director, and that he wanted cable distribution to be controlled by a cable secretary in a secretariat. Then he said, "we must tell [ ] 25X1 to set it up that way."

25X1 Smith then called General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, and told him that he was setting up a cable secretariat in CIA and that he wanted a [ ] 25X1 to be located and ordered to call Smith in Washington. Smith did not ask Collins to 25X1 arrange for [ ] to be assigned to the Agency -- he simply told Collins "I want him."

25X1 When [ ] expressed concern that an officer from outside CIA would know nothing of the organization, procedures, and administration of the Agency, Smith told him not to worry -- "this is a sharp young officer who knows what I want; he will learn fast;

25X1 \* [ ] Assistant Director for Communications (ADCO), then reporting to the DDP.

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if he does not, we will find someone else." Smith then told [ ] that he feared that some blunder overseas might become public knowledge before he learned anything about the situation that caused it. He said, "a general who does not know what his troops in the field are doing is no good -- he is not in command."

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A few days later Smith held a staff meeting that was attended by all of the deputy directors and assistant directors, including, of course, [ ]. Smith addressed the group at length on the treatment to be given incoming and outgoing messages, particularly the addressee and originator information. Speaking directly to [ ], he said that he wanted cable procedures established that would make it clear that the DCI was "in command" and would have access to all messages through a command element directly responsible to the DCI and would eliminate the addressing of messages to subordinates and subordinate elements, both at headquarters and in the field. In the field the senior representative at any given field station was to be "in command" just as was the DCI at headquarters. 23/

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[ ] had his orders, and he carried them out promptly. On 9 July, only a few days after the DCI's staff meeting, he submitted to the Director a memorandum on "Establishment of a CIA Message Center." 24/ The memorandum first established the facts bearing on the matter:

1. The CIA Signal Center, operating under the Assistant Director for Communications, contains a Processing Branch contiguous to the Communications Center, which performs the CIA Message Center function but at a level considerably below the Director of Central Intelligence. It does not have the equivalent of a Cable Secretary.
2. Trained personnel presently assigned to this Processing Branch could immediately serve as a nucleus of a message center organizationally positioned under the Director's Office.
3. Current cable procedures, including distribution and origination principles, are not entirely consonant with the Director's stipulated desires.
4. Cable procedures, in accord with the DCI command and staff concepts, are currently being developed.

The recommendations were these:

1. A CIA Message Center, consisting of a Cable Secretariat and a processing unit be established immediately, and that this be done by redesignation of the present Processing Branch of the Signal Center as the Message Center.
2. The present Chief, Processing Branch be appointed Acting Cable Secretary and be

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responsible to the Director through the Executive Assistant for bringing to the Director's attention all cables warranting such action immediately they are received.

3. Senior Representatives or Chiefs of Station be designated for each station in the Field.

4. Covert Cable Procedures be revised in accordance with the command channels which follow upon the designations recommended above.

5. A firm Table of Organization covering the fully operating CIA Message Center be established after a development and trial operational period.

Smith approved the recommendations on 14 July and returned the memorandum to  with this endorsement: "Put in effect as soon as merger paper is issued and senior reps designated. We must also issue a cable correspondence manual." 25/ The "merger paper" was issued on 15 July 1952 and had an effective date of 1 August. 26/ It was actually a DCI directive that placed the Clandestine Services (which had been established in January 1952 by merging the OSO and OPC) directly under the command of the DDP,\* at that time Frank G. Wisner. The chiefs

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\* The DDP position had been established on 4 January 1951 with Allen W. Dulles as incumbent. Dulles had been Deputy Director for Operations; (cont. on next page)

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of the CS area divisions were designated to serve as channels between headquarters and the various field installations and, in effect, would act as the Director's executive officers for their respective areas of responsibility. The directive also designated senior representatives -- later called chiefs of station -- in field installations and charged them with the responsibility for command supervision of all CIA field activities in their areas.

The final paragraph of the DCI's directive contained the charter for the Cable Secretariat-Message Center:

Procedures. The changed organizational structure recognizes only two command echelons: The Director and the Senior Representatives, with the Deputy Director (Plans) acting for the Director through the medium of the Area Divisions on matters pertaining to the conduct of clandestine activities. . . . Cable procedures will be adopted similar in general to current practices of other Government agencies. The Assistant Director for Communications will prepare for approval and prompt distribution a cable procedure manual in conformity with the above, and will arrange for the establishment of a message center, under the direction of a cable

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(continued) that title was changed to Deputy Director for Plans, but until August 1952 the DDP functioned as a member of the DCI's staff, not as the chief of the Clandestine Services. 27/

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secretary, to centralize and standardize the handling and distribution of communication traffic. When in operation, the message center will become the responsibility of the Executive Assistant to the Director.

The Army Chief of Staff, Collins, had done what Smith had told him to do. On 22 July 1952, just a week after the DCI's directive had been issued and a week before it became effective, [ ]

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[ ] reported for duty, detailed by the Army to CIA.

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[ ] recalls that he reported directly to Smith in the DCI's office and that the interview went substantially as follows: "Well, [ ], I'm glad to see you. How is Mrs. [ ]. Take a few days to get settled in. You know what I want. Do you have any questions? Good. See [ ] for anything you need." The very brief interview did not surprise

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[ ]; he had worked for Smith in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and later in the Secretariat of the General Staff in Supreme Allied Headquarters in Africa (AFAQ) and in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF).

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[ ] knew what Smith wanted, of course, but he soon found that to give it to him he needed more people. The Signal Center processing branch, the

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element that was to be converted to the Cable Secretariat-Message Center, had a T/O of [ ] slots -- barely enough to staff the Message Center alone. As he had been instructed, [ ] with the problem, and [ ] initiated action. In a 26 July 1952 memorandum to Colonel Lawrence K. White, the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration (ADDA), [ ] requested the establishment of a T/O of [ ] slots for the Cable Secretariat. 28/ White approved the request, subject to later review, 29/ and Butler had a total of [ ] positions with which to work.

#### B. Key Personnel Assignments

The first order of business in the use of the [ ] positions was the appointment of people to fill the key slots. The Director had made it quite clear that [ ] was to have the top position, that of Cable Secretary. Before [ ] came on board, Smith told [ ] to nominate a CIA employee -- one with communications and operations experience and familiarity with the organization and administration of the Agency -- to serve as [ ] deputy. [ ] nominated [ ] 30/ who had served as a communications officer in OSS, SSU, CIG, and CIA

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and as an operations officer in CIA since December 1950. At the time that [ ] nominated him,

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25X1 [ ] was serving as Acting Chief of the Far East (FE)

25X1 Division's [ ] Smith approved of

25X1 [ ] qualifications 31/ and the chief of FE re-

25X1 leased [ ] with the understanding that, after a year as the Deputy Cable Secretary, [ ] would return to FE.\*

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The next key position to be filled was that of the Assistant to the Cable Secretary. [ ]

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[ ], Deputy Chief of the Telecommunications Branch of the Operations Division of OC, learned of the vacancy and requested transfer to the Cable Secretariat. Earlier [ ] had served as Chief of the Signal Center [ ] as Signal Center Watch Officer, and as Deputy Chief of the Signal Center. The OC career service board approved his request, and the transfer became effective on 17 August 1952.

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The appointment of [ ] filled the third of the nine additional slots made available to the Cable Secretariat. Four of the nine were earmarked for

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\* Routine personnel actions are not documented here; verification is available in the personnel files of the Cable Secretariat.

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cable duty officers. The slots were GS-12 positions, officially designated as Senior Processing Branch Officers. All four slots were filled by GS-09's who had served in the Signal Center Processing Branch.

25X1 [ ] became chief of the Cable Secretariat Processing Branch, [ ] became assistant chief of the branch [ ] became chief of the Top Secret section of the branch, and [ ]

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25X1 [ ] was appointed with "assignment pending." The remaining two of the nine slots were secretarial ones.

C. Establishing a Table of Organization

Even with the filling of the seven key positions in the Cable Secretariat and the anticipated transfer of the [ ] from the OC Processing Branch, [ ]

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25X1 [ ] knew that he could not handle two of the major functions that properly belonged within the Cable Secretariat -- the responsibility for the screening of outgoing cables and the responsibilities of the Agency Cable Duty Officer. These two functions had not been performed by the OC Processing Branch, and consequently the slots of the 11 officers who did perform them were not to be transferred to the Secretariat. [ ] felt that he would have officers

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capable of doing the jobs or capable of being trained to do them, but he would have to have 11 additional slots for clerical personnel at the GS-03, 04, and 05 levels to handle the routine work that those officers would ordinarily take care of along with their other duties.

At that time clerical personnel were hard to get and hard to keep. In the Secretariat the usual problems of resignation, transfer, and maternity leave were complicated by the necessity for shift work. These problems not only made it almost impossible to get the additional 11 clericals but also made it difficult to keep the clericals who would be transferred to the Secretariat with the OC Processing Branch; and when the first actual T/O for the Cable Secretariat was finally approved by the ADDA on 28 October 1952, it did not provide for the outgoing cable and Agency cable duty officer responsibilities.

The approved T/O was composed of ☐ positions, ☐ transferred from the OC Signal Center Processing Branch and the nine established earlier for the Cable Secretary function. The ☐ positions provided for the continuation of the functions of the OC Processing

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Branch, the new function of the Cable Secretariat itself, and the additional function of a cable courier service. The document that the ADDA approved on 28 October actually listed the Agency cable duty officer responsibilities as belonging to the Secretariat, but one of the endorsements stated that "It is understood that certain of the listed functions (e.g., providing the cable duty officer for the Agency. . .) cannot be performed until additional personnel have come on duty. . . ." 32/

D. Assumption of the Cable Duty Officer Functions

The approval of the [ ] slot T/O did not mean, of course, that [ ] had [ ] people to work with. Although the transfer of the OC Processing Branch personnel began in November 1952, by 1 December the on-duty strength of the Secretariat was only [ ] people; and these were spread among three eight-hour shifts seven days a week. In spite of this overload,

[ ] moved ahead with the effort to absorb the Agency cable duty officer and outgoing cable functions. In September he had reached an agreement with the ADCO, [ ] that the Secretariat would assume the responsibility for screening outgoing cables

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before transmission as soon as 11 additional clericals entered on duty with the Secretariat. By early December, through the efforts of the DDP Chief of Administration (COA), [ ] and the Office of Personnel, the 11 clericals had come on board.

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That made it possible not only to take over the screening of outgoing cables but also to take the first steps toward assuming the Agency cable duty officer function. In August, [ ] had proposed to the DDP that a Secretariat duty officer be authorized to function as the Clandestine Services duty officer during other than normal duty hours -- nights and non-work days. He had promised that within 30 days after its on-duty strength reached [ ] the Secretariat would provide the DDP with competent duty-officer coverage. He kept the promise, and on 29 December 1952 the DDP issued [ ]

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[ ] to become effective on 14 January 1953. On that day the Cable Secretariat Cable Duty Officer (CSDO) Staff began to function as DDP duty officers from 1730 hours to 0830 hours. At the same time, the CSDO's relieved the Signal Center Watch Officer Staff of the

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responsibility for providing duty-officer coverage for the rest of the Agency.

The DDP duty officer chores had been handled by the Foreign Intelligence (FI) Staff; and after the CSDO's took over the job, FI continued for some time to assign officers to act as advisers. The time spent by the FI officers with the CSDO's gradually diminished; and by early February 1953, FI advisory coverage had been reduced to a three-hour period in the late afternoon and early evening -- primarily to give the FI Staff an advance look at cables that otherwise they would not see until the next morning. Thus by the end of January 1953 the Secretariat had acquired the responsibilities for outgoing cable screening and, for the most part, Agency cable duty officer functions -- and [ ] felt that he could provide the kind of cable service that the DCI wanted.

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E. Administrative Support

A necessary part of the development of the Cable Secretariat was the provision of effective administrative support. During the early months of development, from July to mid-November 1952, administrative support had been given willingly and promptly when

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and where it was needed -- after all, the Secretariat was a creature of the DCI, and the Cable Secretary reported to the DCI through the Executive to the DCI. This kind of *ad hoc* support could not continue indefinitely, however, and in November systematic procedures and specific responsibilities were established.

This action took the form of a memorandum of understanding dated 13 November 1952 and signed by

[redacted] the Executive Assistant to the Director;

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[redacted] Chief of the ADDA Organization and Management Staff. 33/ The memorandum was largely a confirmation of support procedures already in effect. A large part of the support came from the components of the DDA -- personnel, logistics, and security.

A significant minor part of the support, however, came from the Office of the DCI and the Office of Communications, which at that time was still a component of the DDP. [redacted] the Budget Officer of O/DCI, handled the Secretariat finances -- funds had been transferred from OC along with functions and personnel. [redacted]

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[ ] Chief of the OC Administrative Staff, had handled the transfer of the positions from OC to the Secretariat and continued to handle personnel and placement matters.

It was the last support function, the handling of personnel matters, that soon led to trouble. The second paragraph of the 18 November 1952 memorandum of understanding was:

The Office of Communications will provide all personnel and career management support for the Cable Secretariat not normally provided by the CIA Personnel Office. The career management of all Cable Secretariat personnel will be administered by the Career Service Board of the Office of Communications before which there will be Cable Secretariat representation when Cable Secretariat personnel are considered. All personnel actions on Cable Secretariat personnel will require joint approval from appropriate representatives of the Office of Communications and the Cable Secretariat.

F. The Career Management Problem

Actually the trouble started when the memorandum of understanding was in draft form -- about two weeks before it was issued on 13 November 1952. [ ] didn't like the drafted "Career Management" paragraph and went to [ ] chairman of the OC career service board, and explained his objections. 34/ There were two: first, the criteria

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by which Secretariat personnel became eligible for consideration for promotion by the OC career board; and second, the provision for the rotation of personnel between OC and the Secretariat. [ ] didn't agree with

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[ ] on either point, 35/ but he was willing to compromise; the draft of the career management paragraph was changed, and when the memorandum of understanding was issued, the paragraph made no mention of the criteria for promotion of Secretariat personnel and no mention of the rotation of personnel between OC and the Secretariat.

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The compromise-by-omission tactic did not satisfy [ ], and the issues were still very much alive. By April 1953 the situation had developed to the point where [ ] felt that something had to be done about it. Accordingly, on 2 April he sent to

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[ ] a three-page memorandum describing the problem, giving specific examples of situations that had developed, and giving his own views on how the career development of Secretariat personnel should be handled.

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[ ] pointed out that the omission of the "promotion criteria" and "rotation policy" in the

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13 November 1952 memorandum had been meaningless and the OC career board had applied both of them in the handling of Secretariat personnel. He explained why those two factors could not be reasonably applied to his people, and he recommended that the career management of Secretariat personnel be placed "elsewhere than in the Office of Communication." 36/

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[ ] discussed the memorandum with [ ] agreed in principle with [ ] recommendation, and suggested that [ ] send the memorandum to

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[ ] did so on 13 April, and on

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1 June [ ] called and told [ ]

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deputy, that he had no objection to -- in fact was in favor of -- [ ] recommendation. 37/ By 12 June a revision of the 13 November 1952 memorandum of understanding had been written and submitted for official approval. 38/ The revision was very much the same as the original; the only major difference was the wording of the last sentence of the "Career Management" paragraph. In the original memorandum the last sentence was:

All personnel actions on Cable Secretariat personnel will require joint approval from appropriate representatives of the Office of Communications and the Cable Secretariat.

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The revision that was submitted for official approval simply changed "Office of Communications" to "Office of the DD/A" -- a small change in words but a major change in procedures. The acting DDA,\* White, approved the change in procedure but thought that the wording should be more explicit. His endorsement stated that his concurrence was subject to an amendment:

Acting Deputy Director (Administration) concurrence in Memorandum of Understanding, "Administrative Support Cable Secretariat" is subject to substitution of the following in lieu of the last sentence of paragraph two, "Career Management":

Procedures for giving approval to personnel actions affecting Cable Secretariat personnel prior to forwarding to the Personnel Office will be jointly developed by appropriate representatives of the Office of the DD/A and the Cable Secretariat.

When the revision was issued on 22 July 1953, it contained White's change in the wording.

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[ ] had not waited for bureaucratic wheels to grind. As soon as he knew that [ ] had

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\* On 1 July 1953 the title of the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration was changed to Deputy Director for Administration. 39/

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approved the transfer of Secretariat personnel management out of OC and that [ ] had no objection to the transfer, he assigned his assistant, [ ], to work with the OC career board -- which no longer had veto authority but did have processing machinery -- to clear up the backlog of Secretariat personnel actions. [ ] still chairman of the OC career board, cooperated fully; and by 16 June 1953 promotions had been approved for three Secretariat officers from GS-09 to GS-11 and for one from GS-07 to GS-09, and promotion recommendations for three others from GS-07 to GS-09 had been scheduled. 40/ Before the actual transfer of Secretariat career management from the OC career board to the DDA career board, then, [ ] plans for promoting his people had been accomplished, and personnel affairs in the Secretariat were in good order.

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III. Establishment of Policy, Procedures,  
and Services

A. Services for the DCI and the Deputy Directors

1. Distribution to the DCI and the DDCI

Within the first few weeks after beginning his duties as Cable Secretary in August 1952, [ ] began to discharge what he saw as his most pressing responsibility -- furnishing to the Director, concurrently with other senior officials -- copies of cables that warranted his attention. To do this and to get

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experience that would provide guidance for his staff, [ ] reviewed every cable processed by the Cable Secretariat. He gave particular attention to those received since the close of business the previous day. He began his review of the overnight accumulation at 0600 hours and made sure that cables he thought the Director should see were processed in time to be in the first delivery at the opening of business. His personal review of all cables continued throughout the working day and started again the next morning.

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In [ ] absence the early review was done by

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[ ] or, in the absence of both, by [ ]. As the number of incoming cables increased and the requirements became greater in number and complexity,

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[ ] had to start his work day at 0300 hours. 41/

In September, after the cable duty officers had gotten a feel for their jobs, responsibility for the selection of cables for the DCI was delegated to them. In addition, and as a particular responsibility, they were to review all outgoing cables for statements involving national policy. 42/ Through [ ], Smith had made it clear that he expected [ ] to bring such cables to his attention before they were transmitted -- unless other action was personally approved by himself or, in his absence, by Dulles, the DDCI.

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[ ] early-morning examination of all cables continued as a means of back-stopping and monitoring his staff's DCI selections, reviewing cable distribution in general, noting and following up on the need for new requirements, checking on the proper release of cables, and checking the quality and legibility of reproduced copies.

Cryptonyms and pseudonyms contained in cables were "broken out," or identified, for the Director by

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the cable duty officer in charge. This was done by printing the identifying phrase or the true name directly above the code designations wherever they appeared in the text of the cable. Without these identities the text of a cable was almost unintelligible, except to those officers primarily involved with the project or subject. In late August this selection and identity service was extended to the DDCI who, until then, had shared the Director's copy. 43/

The Cable Secretariat cryptonym and pseudonym card file of identities -- inherited from the Signal Center -- was far from complete; and in instances when a search of the file failed to produce an identity, the words "No Info" were printed above the code designation. This service was provided only for the DCI and the DDCI, and [ ] instructions to the staff were precise: "There must be no guessing -- either we know, we find out, or we say we don't know." 44/

[ ] way of finding out was to design a small routing slip that -- if the cable was to be furnished to the Director -- the cable duty officers attached to the action unit's copy of every cable

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containing an unknown code designation. The slip was addressed from the cable duty officer to the chief of the action unit, it identified the cable, and it was worded to the effect that "We have no identifying data for the Director on [cryptonym]. Your cooperation in supplying us with an identity will be appreciated." When the identity was received, the cable duty officer passed the information on to [ ] secretary by note or telephone, and then a card was made and added to the Cable Secretariat file.

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This method of obtaining data proved to be an unsatisfactory solution to the problem because it provided data after the fact when the obvious solution was to obtain the data before it was needed. Only a few "No Info's" reached Smith's desk before his displeasure was made known to the Cable Secretary, to the DDP, and to the DDP's senior staff. Immediately thereafter, a file of identities that the DDP had used in his Administration Building office was transferred to the Cable Secretariat; and area division chiefs were directed to furnish the Cable Secretariat with identities of all code designations that might be expected to appear in cables.

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To make it easier for the Director and the DDCI to read cables, in October 1952 [ ] developed a procedure that involved the preparation of synopses for cables furnished to the DCI and the DDCI.\* These synopses, "briefs," as they came to be called, were particularly helpful in cases where a current cable made reference to several prior cables that had not been furnished to the DCI or the DDCI. By summarizing these references as background in the synopsis of the current cable, the necessity for including the prior cables as attachments was eliminated. A half-page form was designed, and briefs were not to exceed the limits of the single half page.\*\* This was a new responsibility for the cable duty officers, but they rapidly adapted to the requirements of condensing the substance of a two- or three-page cable to the half-page limit of the briefing form. This was no easy job, but the efforts were well received by Smith and Dulles, and within a few months other officials began to request the same service.

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\* Such cables were referred to as "DCI Selects."

\*\* See Figure 1, p. 39.

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The number of DCI Selects averaged between three and four percent of all CIA cables processed; in October 1952 there were 573, in November 606, and in December 581.

2. Distribution to the Deputy Directors

In February 1953 the Cable Secretariat began to furnish to Loftus E. Becker, the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), briefs of those cables that were distributed to both the DCI and the DDI. Briefs of such cables continued to be furnished to the DDI when Robert Amory, Jr., replaced Becker on 1 May 1953. 45/ Also in February 1953 Charles V. Hulick, the DDP Executive Officer, requested that break-outs be made for the DDP's copies of cables furnished to both the DCI and the DDP. The Cable Secretariat complied with this request and in April began to prepare briefs for the DDP and to make distribution to him identical to that being made for the DCI and the DDCI. 46/

Allen Dulles was sworn in on 26 February 1953 as DCI, succeeding Smith. On 23 April 1953 Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell was sworn in as DDCI. President Eisenhower had named Cabell to succeed Dulles as DDCI on 24 January 1953. 47/ The Cable Secretariat's

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selection, break-outs, and briefing of cables for the DCI and the DDCI continued as before, unaffected by these changes.

At that time the DDP, Frank Wisner, maintained two offices, one in the Administration Building near the office of the Director and one in L Building near the offices of his senior staff and the operating units of the Clandestine Services. Wisner divided his working day between the two offices, and -- because he could never know when the DCI might want to speak with him about any given cable -- he asked the Cable Secretariat to provide both of his offices with copies of DCI Selects complete with break-outs and briefs. The Cable Secretariat complied. The DDP's requirements for cables, and other than DCI Selects, were extensive, and a large number of cables were sent to him, copies of which were delivered only to the L Building office. These were processed without either break-outs or briefs, but were arranged in numerical order. 48/

In April 1953, break-out service was extended to the DDA, then Walter R. Wolf, for cables that were disseminated to both the DCI and the DDA. There were

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very few of these at the time, for one reason because [redacted] the DDP/COA -- later designated DDP-Admin -- had assumed the basic administrative support functions for the Clandestine Services when that component was established by Smith. 49/ Another reason was that in April the DDA's subjective cable requirements, and those of the DDA complex of offices, were still in the process of being coordinated with the DDP.

Cable requirements for the DDA had been sent to the DDP in November 1952, and there the matter rested until 17 August 1953, 50/ when agreement was reached on the type of Clandestine Services Cables the Cable Secretariat should furnish the DDA and his component offices. These requirements, which were approved by White on 31 August 1953, described three types of cables that were *not* to be distributed to the DDA initially but could be made available to him upon approval of the DDP or the action unit:

- (1) Cables concerning purely routine administration.
- (2) Cables bearing indicators which by direction limit distribution to specific offices among which DD/A is not named.
- (3) Cables containing operational or operational administrative information.

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The cable distribution requirements for DDA component offices contained the same provisions -- except (1), which was applicable only to the DDA himself.\* 51/

3. Cable Deliveries

Although it was understood that the Cable Secretariat's responsibility for providing a cable delivery service for the Agency would be delayed until its courier staff entered on duty, [ ] did not delay delivery service for the Director and the Deputy Directors. In September 1952 he established a cable delivery schedule that provided for concurrent delivery during the normal work days at eight and ten o'clock in the morning and two and four o'clock in the afternoon. [ ] used Cable Secretariat mail clerks,

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\* These requirements remained in effect without substantive change until 3 February 1955. At that time there was a major reorganization in which the Administration directorate became the Support directorate and the DDA became the DDS. An agreement between the DDS and the DDP abolished the DDP Administrative Staff. Responsibility for the functions of the staff shifted with the career service transfer of its members to the DDS and the offices under his command. The functions of the staff continued without interruption under the direction of the Special Support Assistant, who represented the DDS in the Clandestine Services (SSA/DDS). Under this agreement the DDP delegated to the SSA/DDS authority for specified administrative actions within the Clandestine Services.

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supervisors, and cable duty officers for these deliveries, which were referred to as "hill runs."\* Most of the senior officials on the hill were at their desks by a few minutes after eight o'clock, and the first hill run was timed to arrive no later than eight-ten. On Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays the first hill run was timed for nine o'clock, unless otherwise directed, and additional deliveries were adjusted to the actual work schedule of the Administration Building offices. Two and sometimes three deliveries were made on Saturdays, and frequently one or more deliveries were made on Sundays and holidays.

The Receipt and Delivery Section of the Records Integration Division (RID/R&D) of the DDP was responsible for providing messenger service for cables, dispatches, and mail within the DDP complex. This service included carrying outgoing cables to the Signal Center, carrying incoming cables to recipients, and carrying cables between divisions for coordination.

The DDP staffs and divisions were concentrated

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\* The E-Street area where the North, Central, Administration, and South buildings were located was referred to as "the hill."

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in J, K, and L Buildings, except for the Western Hemisphere Division (WH), which was located in Quarters Eye, a half mile away. One RID/R&D courier,

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[ ] was used full time for the exchange of classified mail between WH and other DDP offices. To assist the Cable Secretariat, [ ] volunteered to make deliveries of cables to the WH Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). 52/ [ ], chief of RID, approved the arrangement and authorized it to continue after the Secretariat assumed responsibility for the delivery of cables. A similar arrangement was made with [ ], chief of the Mail and Courier Branch of the Logistics office, for the delivery of cables to the Personnel Office and the Office of Training. Without this assistance from [ ] the Secretariat could not have made deliveries to its Potomac Park customers without adding an additional courier to its staff.

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It was the middle of March 1953 before the Secretariat's five-man courier staff had entered on

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duty and was being fully used, one courier assigned to the hill runs and four covering I, J, K, and L Buildings.\* Secretariat couriers handled cables exclusively and were not required to carry any other type of mail. During the normal work week they made six scheduled deliveries a day to a central cable desk in each area division, staff, and office in I, J, K, and L Buildings. On these runs they picked up outgoing cables that had been released and were ready for transmission, but they were not authorized to carry cables between offices for coordination; to do so would delay scheduled deliveries of incoming cables. 53/

The Cable Secretariat did not provide week-end or holiday courier service to Agency components except the hill offices. Other offices open on those days would send someone to the Secretariat to pick up their cables. The offices of the DDP and his divisions and staffs regularly worked a half day on Saturdays and called for their cables several times before closing at about one o'clock. Thereafter, until the opening of business on the next normal

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\* See Figure 2, p.47.

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working day, offices relied upon the Secretariat cable duty officer to alert their on-call duty officer to any cable that required action out of normal working hours.

For cables bearing a precedence of "Priority," notification by the cable duty officer was optional, but for the two higher precedences, "Operational Immediate" and "Emergency," it was mandatory that after-hours delivery be made to the action unit 54/ or to a designated representative regardless of the time the cable was received. The majority of calls were made on "Operational Immediate" cables, action responsibility for which was almost exclusively assigned to the various DDP area divisions, and division duty officers were frequent visitors to the Cable Secretariat at all hours of the night.

B. Cable Regulations and Procedures

In his July 1952 memorandum, General Smith had instructed the ADCO to "prepare for approval and prompt distribution a cable procedure manual," and on 30 July 1952 the ADCO's staff issued a manual to become effective concurrently with the establishment of the Clandestine Services on 1 August.

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The manual, *Covert Cable Manual (Headquarters)*, was largely a revision of OSO cable procedures and guides that served as basic instructions for Signal Center processing of cables. There was little or no change in cable terminology, in security classification rules, in assignment of precedence, or in general security precautions -- these were subjects not affected by the Director's assumption of command control of cable communication.

In the drafting of new rules the ADCO's staff had drawn heavily on the wording of the Director's memorandum, which -- in effect -- stated that only those officials designated by the DCI were authorized to release cables; that the Cable Secretariat would maintain a list -- with specimen signatures -- of such officials and would accept only cables bearing signatures of those officials; that it was mandatory for outgoing cables to be coordinated with and physically pass through the area division responsible for the activities of the addressee; and that the chief of the area division would act as an executive officer to the Director for the release of cables to officials in his area. 55/

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command and staff concepts, and the manual might well have been approved for publication had procedures for addressing of cables stopped with the basic system described above. The reason that it was not, was that the system of address indicators controlled by the ADSO provided for a person-to-person indicator that resulted in an "EYES ONLY" distribution to a single official --

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In view of the ADCO staff's awareness of the Director's "two-echelon" command concept, it is not clear why the manual included a procedure for "EYES ONLY" addressing of cables to anyone other than the Director or his senior representatives, but in a sub-paragraph it did:

- (3) Internal Address for Person to Person Messages requiring minimal handling addressed to one given individual *only* will be processed under the following conditions.
  - (a) Such messages may be released by the Director, his authorized headquarters representatives, those designated by the Director as field senior officials, and those sub-field officials at bases and sub-bases designated by senior officials.
  - (b) Such messages may be addressed to
    - (1) the Director, CIA, or his authorized headquarters representatives, (2) senior representatives or chiefs of stations,

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bases, or sub-bases, and (3) individuals subordinate to the originator.

- (c) Such messages will be delivered directly to the addressee by the receiving Signal Center. 58/

This was a clear and precise procedure. If approved as worded, it would authorize cables to be addressed to the DDP, the COP, senior staff chiefs, and area division chiefs; and it would authorize the Signal Center to deliver such cables only to the official addressee, thus by-passing the Director and his Cable Secretariat. This, of course, was totally

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unacceptable to [redacted]. He knew that Smith was intensely dissatisfied with this "EYES ONLY" practice, as it had existed in the OSO addressing system, because -- as noted earlier in this paper -- he feared that some blunder overseas would become public knowledge before he knew anything about the situation that had produced it. As he had put it to [redacted] a general who does not know what his field forces are doing is not in command.

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[redacted] had taken on the task of editing and organizing the procedural material in the manual into the format of an Agency regulation and of coordinating the proposed regulation. He consulted [redacted]

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on the wording that the Director preferred for person-to-person addressing of cables, and after several drafts the following met with  approval:

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(c) Internal Address for Person to Person Messages

Person to person indicators such as "EYES ONLY" and "EYES ALONE" are not authorized for use in cables. To effect distribution to *one individual only*, the pseudonym of the addressee; e. g. , will be used. Person to person cables are authorized for the following categories of officials *only*:

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- (1) Person to person cables to Washington may not be addressed to any specific individual other than the Director of Central Intelligence.
- (2) Person to person cables *from* Washington may be addressed to any Senior Field Official, but may not be addressed to any individual subordinate to the Senior Field Official.

Three additional provisions of the regulation authorized person-to-person cables from Washington to headquarters representatives on temporary duty within the area of a senior field official -- but only for cables that dealt with matters clearly outside the sphere of responsibility of the senior field official; authority was also given for senior field officials to exchange person-to-person cables, but a senior field official was prohibited from addressing such

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cables to any individual subordinate to another senior field official.

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The final provision charged senior field officials with responsibility for establishing policies governing person-to-person cables within their own commands. [ ] completed the coordination of the proposed regulation during September, and with the approval of the DDA it was published on 28 October 1952 as [ ] the DDP approved the field version, and on 7 November 1952 it was published as [ ]

Smith was displeased with cables addressed for his personal attention only, and in one such instance his cabled response was a bit caustic:

LET ME SAVE YOUR OVERWORKED CODE CLERKS SOME TIME. MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO ME AUTOMATICALLY GO TO DULLES AND TO ALL OTHERS DIRECTLY INTERESTED. THOSE EMANATING FROM YOU ARE ASSUMED HERE TO REPRESENT THE OPINIONS OF YOUR STAFF INCLUDING . . . IF LATTER ASSUMPTION INCORRECT, PLEASE INFORM. OTHERWISE SUGGEST YOU CONFORM TO CABLE INSTRUCTIONS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. 59/

He was also quick to express his views on "EYES ONLY" addressing of cables to officials other than himself, advising one senior representative in a "Personal-from-the-Director" cable dated 3 November 1952:

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AS MY SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE IT IS IMPROPER FOR YOU TO DIRECT MESSAGES FOR THE EYES ONLY OF ANYONE IN THIS AGENCY BESIDES MYSELF. MOREOVER, I HAVE PROVIDED SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT SUCH RESTRICTIONS. KINDLY COMPLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS YOU HAVE RECEIVED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSMISSION OF CABLES. 60/

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[ ] sent a copy of this cable to C. V. Hulick, EO/DDP, suggesting that it might be wise to inform releasing officers to avoid use of the "EYES ONLY" term and to have them advise the field officials not to use it in cables addressed to the Director. 61/ Because the

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[ ] regulation had not yet been published and because it would require several weeks to reach the

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[ ] after publication, cabled instructions seemed justified.\*

C. Cable Volume and Reduction Efforts\*\*

In March 1953 CIA cable volume reached a new high

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\* In 1954 the term "EYES ONLY" was restored for use in cable addressing, but the restrictions that limited the use of the term to cables for the DCI or a chief of station or base remained in effect. A provision added in 1967 enjoined field officials that "Cables requiring action at headquarters should not be addressed EYES ONLY to the Director unless it is intended that the Director personally take the action indicated." 62/

\*\* This brief discussion covers only the early efforts to reduce cable volume. For a full discussion of the cable reduction program, see IV, below, p. 82.

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of 14,900 cables, and in April the new DCI, Dulles, issued a notice that directed Agency personnel to review all cable traffic for the purpose of reducing the volume by diverting to pouch facilities all correspondence not requiring the most expeditious handling. The notice pointed out that the Depart-

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DCI considered it imperative that a similar reduction be made in CIA cables. 63/

During the next eight months the Cable Secretariat became deeply involved in the compilation of statistical data for use in measuring the success or failure of Agency efforts to achieve the reduction requested by the DCI. The Cable Secretariat's study of approximately 5,450 cables processed during the first 15 days of June 1953 provided the following:

One: Intelligence cables comprised only 7.2% of the total incoming traffic; operational 62%; administrative 31%.

Two: Total traffic exchanged with the various geographic areas: EE 25.5%; FE 34.6%; NE 11.8%; SE 6.2%; WE 16.0%; and WH 5.7%.

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Three: Originators of Outgoing Cables: DD/P Area Divisions and Staff components 84.1%; COMMO 3.7 %; Finance Division (FD) 3.1%; Transportation Division (LO/TD) 2.4%; and all other components 6.6%.

Four: Incoming action assignments: DD/P Area Division and Staff components 90.3%; COMMO 4.9%; Finance Division 4.0%; all other components .8%.  
64/

Compilation of figures for these four categories of cables continued through December 1953, and although there were fluctuations of a point or so from one month to another, at year end the only change of substance was in the administrative category, which was down to 25 percent, a decrease of six points. 65/

Cable volume had always fluctuated from one month to another, and it continued to do so during the six months that followed the issuance of the DCI's directive. Measured from the April base figure of 13,800 cables, October volume of 10,950 cables was a reduction of 2,850 cables, nearly 21 percent.

In theory, if this reduction was a direct result of the diversion of cables to pouch facilities, there should be a corresponding decrease in Signal Center workload as measured by group count, and there should be a corresponding increase in the workload of RI as measured by the number of documents pouched. In

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actual application, however, this apparent correlation in cables, group count, and pouched documents did not work out as anticipated.

In November the Organization and Management Staff (O&MS) of the DDA compiled a tabulation of the Cable Secretariat's cable volume, the Signal Center's group count, and RI's pouched document volume. These data led to the conclusion that factors other than the diversion of cables to pouch channels had contributed to the reduction in cable volume and that it appeared necessary that further efforts would be required to carry out the DCI's directive.

With the Signal Center's group count down only by 4.6 percent in December -- indicating more words per cable -- and a 5.1 percent increase in documents pouched by RI, it appeared that little real progress had been made.\* 66/

The decline in cable volume, measured from the March high of 14,900 to the December figure of 10,100 was most fortunate for the Secretariat, which at the close of 1953 was operating with an on-duty strength of  people -- seven short of its adjusted T/O of  slots.

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\* See Figure 3, p. 59.

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FIGURE 3

Extract from O&MS Study, November 1953

## Cables, Group Count, and Pouched Documents

1953	Cables a/		Cable Groups b/		Pouched Documents c/	
	Number	Percent Change	Number (Thousands)	Percent Change	Number	Percent Change
Jan	12,365		3,976		25,821	
Feb	12,208		3,961		26,695	
Mar	14,904		4,562		27,598	
Apr	13,831	Base	4,460	Base	36,198	Base
May	11,539	-16.6	4,115	- 7.7	30,489	-15.8
Jun	12,391	-10.4	3,925	-12.0	30,794	-14.9
Jul	12,161	-12.1	4,539	+ 1.8	37,394	+ 3.3
Aug	10,774	-22.1	3,855	-13.6	30,628	-15.4
Sep	10,301	-25.5	3,846	-13.8	30,273	-16.4
Oct	10,954	-20.8	4,257	- 4.6	38,028	+ 5.1

- a. Cable Secretariat cable count.  
b. Signal Center group(word) count.  
c. RID pouched document count.

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non-CIA cables to all other CIA components, including the DCI. The combined volume of cables from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) fluctuated between 7,000 and 8,000 a month, the major portion from State. Of the total number, about 25 percent were screened in the Secretariat and were filed as being not responsive to the DDP components' stated requirements. The remaining 75 percent were processed by the simple method of multiple routing, under cover sheets, of several copies of each cable to three or four components. About 300 of these cables each month were of such wide general interest that they had to be typed, proofed, reproduced, and mailed to customers in the same manner as that used for CIA cables. 68/

From 30 June to 10 July 1953 [ ] was on detail to the Department of State at the request of General Smith, who was then Under Secretary of State. Smith had borrowed [ ] to survey State's Secretariat Message Center procedures and to take a fresh look at State's guidelines for distribution of cables to CIA. In a 13 July personal letter to the DCI, Smith had this to say of [ ] detail to the Department:

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[ ] approach was direct and constructive. His suggestions for improvements in our Message Center procedures are being implemented. He has provided the Secretariat with a fuller under-

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[ ]

The DCI forwarded a copy of the General's

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letter to [ ] under a covering memorandum in which he expressed his appreciation and belief that "The work that you did will aid both the Department and this Agency in achieving common aims." 70/

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[ ]

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
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2. DDI Suspense Procedures

From August 1952 to July 1953 the Cable Secretariat distributed to the DDI cables containing substantive intelligence information, but not when

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such cables contained operational information in addition to the intelligence information. A number of cables containing both types of information were received each month, and for these the Secretariat restricted dissemination to components of the DDP -- the only exception was the inclusion of the DCI and the DDCI. Loftus Becker, the DDI, protested to [ ] that intelligence information contained in these cables was frequently mentioned in the DCI's morning staff meetings, and this caused him, Becker, great embarrassment because, having no prior knowledge of the information available to others in the meeting, he was unprepared to answer questions raised by the DCI. Becker argued that he was not aware of any limitation on the DDI receiving operational information and that it seemed obvious that the DDI's need to have cables containing substantive intelligence, so that he might be able to answer questions raised by the DCI, had no relation to whether or not the cable contained operational information. 75/

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[ ] replied that he personally saw no objection to furnishing such cables to the DDI; but in the absence of a directive reflecting DDI and DDP coordination

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he believed that he should continue to follow the instructions of Richard Helms, the DDP Chief of Operations (COP), which were to the effect that for protection of methods and sources, the distribution of Clandestine Services cables containing intelligence information was to be confined to Clandestine Services components when such cables also contained sensitive operational information. 76/ Existing procedures provided for intelligence information to be extracted from such cables and passed to certain DDI components by teletype or memorandum, but this process was considerably slower than receiving initial dissemination of cables from the Secretariat.

25X1 When Amory succeeded Becker, Amory's protests to [ ] were identical to those of Becker but decidedly more vehement. [ ] restated the position he had taken on the issue when it had been raised by Becker -- that an agreement between the DDI and the DDP about what cables would be furnished the DDI was 25X1 necessary. [ ] said that the DCI was aware of the distribution policy being applied to the type of cables that Amory wanted and that he had received no instruction from the DCI to modify the policy.

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Amory was unsuccessful in arranging with the DDP an agreement that would permit the Secretariat to furnish the DDI with cables containing a combination of intelligence and operational information, and Secretariat dissemination policy for such cables remained unchanged until July 1953.

At that time the DCI intervened and charged the Cable Secretary with the responsibility of furnishing the DDI with all intelligence items contained in cables. The method by which the Cable Secretary would discharge this new responsibility was described as follows:

The Cable Secretary will refer those cables which, in his judgment, might contain material of a sensitive operational nature to the appropriate Area Division to determine whether the entire cable or only portions may be released to the DD/I; and, in addition, to obtain guidance from the Area Division as to the breadth of the dissemination within and beyond the DD/I. If the entire cable is not forwarded to the DD/I, the DD/P will cause the appropriate portions to be transmitted by PD, teletype, or other means.

In the event that the Cable Secretary believes a cable or portion thereof contains material of intelligence value and the Area Division recommends that it not be disseminated to the DD/I, the Cable Secretary will refer the issue to the Executive Assistant to the Director to obtain the decision of the Director or the Deputy Director.

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In order to assist the Cable Secretary in performing the screening function and to ensure that the requirements of the DD/I are being met, the DD/I will require a senior member of his office, who has limited official contacts outside of CIA, and who is acceptable to the DD/P to spot-check on one day of each month all incoming cables received by the Cable Secretariat during a day, but which were not selected for distribution to the DD/I. Excluded from the cables the DD/I representative may see will be EYES ONLY, KAPOK, RYBAT, and such other cables as are specifically designated by the DCI. Such cables received during the day under examination will be sent by the Cable Secretary to the EA/DCI for verification by the DCI that they should be withheld. 77/

This procedure was proposed in a 7 July 1953 DCI memorandum addressed to the DDCI, the DDP, the DDI, and the Cable Secretary. The change was to become effective on 31 July, but it was delayed until 20 July to allow time for the Cable Secretary to obtain from the DDP and the DDI concurrences on Secretariat operating instructions governing the new procedure. These instructions involved the identification of cables containing a combination of intelligence and operational information by placing the phrase "Suspense DD/I" on the dissemination line of the cable and the attachment of a "Cable Suspense Sheet" to the action copy of the cable. The cable suspense sheet was a half-page form\* designed and printed on bright yellow

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\* See Figure 4, p. 69.

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Figure 4

Cable Suspend Sheet

FORM 75  
USE PREVIOUS  
EDITIONS  
6-73

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CABLE SUSPENSE SHEET		REPLY REQUESTED	DATE
		EXPEDITE	SUSPENSE TIME
SUSPENSE ACTION: _____		FROM: CABLE SECRETARIAT - 1 A 53 HQS.	
<p>THE ATTACHED CABLE APPEARS TO CONTAIN POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AS WELL AS SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION AND IS SUSPENDED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE TO THE FOLLOWING <u>ENCIRCLED</u> UNITS:</p> <p>FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY: DDI, D/OCI, DDS&amp;T, D/OSI, D/FMSAC, D/MS, D/ONE</p> <p>PLEASE INDICATE BELOW THE ACTION DESIRED AND RETURN THIS FORM AND THE CABLE TO THE CABLE SECRETARIAT BY THE TIME SHOWN ABOVE. SEE PARAGRAPH 70, <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;">OATEO 6 APRIL 1967.</span></p>			
REPLY TO: CABLE SECRETARIAT		TUBE CT 7 or ES 6	
<p>( ) DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF CABLE ( ) AS RECEIVED ( ) AS MODIFIED FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY TO: THE UNITS ENCIRCLED ABOVE: TO C/FI 2, CIW, DDO/DO AND THIS DIVISION.</p> <p>( ) CABLE MAY NOT BE RELEASED. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS BEING DISSEMINATED AS TDFIR _____</p> <p>( ) CABLE MAY NOT BE RELEASED. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED BY MEMORANDUM IN ATTACHED ENVELOPE(S) ADDRESSED "DDI (SUSPENSE CABLE RELEASE)" AND IF APPROPRIATE "DDS&amp;T (SUSPENSE CABLE RELEASE)." PLEASE FORWARD MEMORANDUM TO ADDRESSEE(S).</p> <p>( ) CABLE MAY NOT BE RELEASED. FILE. (TO ASSIST DDO REVIEW OF CLANDESTINE SERVICES SUSPENSE SYSTEM, GIVE ONE OR TWO SENTENCE REASON)</p>			

SIGNATURE

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During August, the first full month in which the suspense procedure was in effect, out of a total of 7,000 incoming cables the Secretariat suspended 45 for DDI distribution. A tabulation of the actions taken on the suspended cables follows:

Released to the DDI, AD/CI, and FI/RQM-----	10
Released through preliminary dissemination-----	27
Released to OCI by telephone-----	4
Release to the DDI disapproved-----	4

The four cables that the area divisions disapproved for release to the DDI were considered to be "too sensitive," "operational information," or "information received from another agency"; and the Cable Secretary concurred in the decisions of the area divisions. 79/

In September there were 63 cables suspended and nine cables disapproved for release. [ ] the Deputy Cable Secretary, did not concur with the reasons given for one disapproval and forwarded the cable to [ ] to force release of the intelligence information. [ ] agreed with [ ], and the information was released to the DDI. In October the number of suspense items rose [ ] were disapproved for release; and again there was

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one that [ ] referred to [ ] with his reasons for non-concurrence. Again [ ] agreed with [ ]

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In November there were a total of 154 suspense items, 19 of them disapproved for release for reasons that were concurred in by the Cable Secretariat. Among the disapproval reasons given by the area divisions were these:

- Lateral cable, not for Washington action;
- CE internal security material;
- Previously disseminated, contains no new information;
- Awaiting confirmation before dissemination;
- Dissemination disapproved because of incorrect information;
- Operational source identification; and
- Available from other sources, overt press coverage.

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[ ] did not agree that overt press coverage was a valid reason for disapproving release of information to the DDI, and he instructed the Cable Secretary to so inform the area divisions should that reason be used again.

The DCI memorandum upon which the DDI suspense procedure was based prescribed that once each month a representative of the DDI, one acceptable to the DDP, would screen one day's cable volume as a check on the Cable Secretariat's performance. There were a number of steps involved in the implementation of this action:

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One: A call was made to the DDI's office for the name of the representative who would screen the cables.

Two: A call was made to the DDP COP's office to furnish him the name of the DDI representative and to get his approval of the person named.

Three: All incoming cables received in one 24-hour day were assembled for screening.

Four: The assembled cables were screened by the Secretariat to remove those sensitive operational cables that the DCI had indicated should not be shown to the DDI representative -- EYES ONLY, KAPOK, RYBAT, and a number of others identified by cryptonym.

Five: Cables selected for exclusion were sent to the EA/DCI for verification by the DCI that the cables should be withheld.

Six: An appointment was made for the DDI representative to review the cables in the office of the Cable Secretary.

Early in the week of 21 September 1953 [ ]

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advised [ ] that Amory, the DDI, had designated

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[ ] of OCI as the DDI representative

to screen one day's incoming cable traffic. [ ]

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informed Helms, the DDP COP, and arranged for [ ]

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to do the screening on 24 September.

Incoming traffic for the 23rd was assembled, and

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[ ] separated it into two groups, one group for

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screening by [ ], the other group for screening by

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[ ]. There were 247 cables involved, 65 of which

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25X1 were sent to [ ] for verification that they should  
be withheld from [ ] screening. [ ] screened  
the remaining 182 cables and found only one cable of  
possible interest to the DDI that had not been  
distributed to or suspended for the DDI. [ ] 25X1  
personal opinion was that the cable was of counter-  
espionage interest only, but he arranged for future  
cables on the same subject to be suspended for the  
DDI. 80/

25X1 The second DDI cable screener was [ ] 25X1  
[ ] a special assistant to the DDI. [ ] screened 25X1  
cables once each month from October 1953 through March  
1954. The press of other business caused [ ] 25X1  
to cancel screening appointments in April, May, and  
June.\*

In six consecutive screening visits [ ] 25X1  
had found that the Cable Secretariat had failed to  
suspend only five or six cables of possible DDI  
interest, and he recommended to Amory that the

25X1  
\* [ ] became the first Director of the National  
Indications Center (NIC), activated as a community  
support staff in July 1954. 81/ Preparation for this  
assignment may well have been the reason for cancelling  
appointments to screen cables.

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25X1 screening function be discontinued. Amory did not act on the recommendation, and in July 1954 he named [ ] as his representative to screen cables.

25X1 By January 1955 [ ] was convinced that the one-day-a-month screening of cables was serving no good purpose and that the DDI suspense procedure was not meeting the needs of the DDI. He discussed the matter with [ ] and then the two of them went to Amory to get the DDI's personal view on the problem. Amory pointed out that the suspense procedure was of little help to him; he was still attending DCI meetings at which was discussed cable information that had been made available to the DDP, the deputy DDP, and the DDP/COP but had not reached his, Amory's, desk because it had been delayed by the suspense procedure. He thought that the only solution was to provide the DDI himself with copies of all cables containing intelligence information immediately on receipt of the cables. He suggested that the suspense procedure might still be used for dissemination to DDI components -- primarily OCI -- and that the spot-check screening be continued. [ ] agreed with

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Amory, but he pointed out that only the DCI had the authority to change the suspense procedure and that the initiative would have to come from Amory -- which it did; the procedure was soon altered, and the DDI was included in the initial distribution of cables that contained intelligence information.

The one-day-a-month DDI spot check continued, however, as did the application of the suspense system to DDI components. In February 1956 [ ] replaced [ ] as the DDI spot-checker; in October 1957 [ ] replaced [ ] and in May 1958 [ ] replaced [ ] A year later, in May 1959, Amory decided that the spot check on the suspense items was no longer necessary. He so informed the DDP/COP; and on 14 May, [ ] was informed that the spot-check screening was to be discontinued.

E. Vital Records and Emergency Planning

1. Vital Records

In July 1953 [ ] arranged with [ ] chief of the Signal Center, for the Cable Secretariat vital records to be stored with those of the Signal Center at the Agency's emergency relocation site, [ ]

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In the event of an emergency that necessitated the evacuation of headquarters buildings, both the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat would relocate and resume their functions in the same building at the relocation site. At that time the only records considered vital in the processing of cables at the site were copies of the Secretariat's cable distribution guide and a set of standard operating procedures. On 3 July 1953 copies of these were deposited with the Signal Center for safekeeping. 82/

To provide break-out service for the DCI at the relocation site, however, it was necessary to find a way of duplicating the Secretariat's cryptonym and pseudonym card file, which by that time contained many thousands of identity cards. On 23 October 1953,

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[ ] discussed this problem with [ ]

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deputy chief of RID. [ ] said that furnishing the Secretariat with duplicate cards was out of the question; it was all that his staff could do to keep the file updated with additions and deletions. He also said that the only practical way of duplicating the file was to microfilm it, as was done every three or four months for RID's file, and he offered

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to have his camera man film the Secretariat file.

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[ ] accepted the offer, and the file was filmed during November. Five 100-foot reels were required, and these were deposited with the Signal Center on 3 December 1953, 83/ completing the vital records needed by the Secretariat for emergency processing of cables at the relocation site.

## 2. Emergency Planning

On 22 October 1953 [ ] represented the Cable Secretary at a conference between Office of Communications and General Services representatives that was called for the purpose of establishing requirements for supplies and equipment in the event that it became necessary to evacuate headquarters and resume activities at the relocation site. For the purpose of a joint emergency plan it was agreed that Secretariat personnel would integrate their actions according to an existing Signal Center plan. Under this plan the Cable Secretary, [ ] and Deputy Cable Secretary, [ ] and the Executive Officer, [ ], would rely on the Chief of the Signal Center, [ ] to alert them to the existence of an emergency. [ ] would move immediately to the relocation site when [ ] sounded the alert; [ ] was

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25X1 designated group leader for the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat. Designated assistant group leader under [ ] would alert certain personnel, direct the securing of the Cable Secretariat work area, and collect all cables and file copies of cables processed the previous day and place the material in canvas pouches. After these tasks had been done, the designated "emergency force" would move to the site, carrying the pouches. All transportation to the site was to be by privately owned vehicles.

25X1 [ ] Deputy Chief of the Signal Center, were assigned the task of drafting an ADCO memorandum to the commanding officer of the site, outlining the joint requirements of the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat for expendable and non-expendable supplies. 25X1 [ ] the ADCO, signed this memorandum on 20 November 1953 and forwarded it through General Services to [ ] commanding officer of the relocation site. The memorandum contained a requirement for a microfilm reader for the Secretariat's exclusive use in breaking out identities for the DCI. 84/

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F. Other Activities and Events

On 18 August 1953 [ ] left Washington on military orders to attend the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During his absence [ ] was designated Acting Cable Secretary. [ ] was away for almost four months; he returned to Washington on 23 December 1953 and was then on leave until 4 January 1954.

In July 1952, when the chief of the Far East Division had released [ ] for assignment as Deputy Cable Secretary, it had been with the understanding that the detail would be for one year, after which

[ ] would return to FE. As of mid-October 1953, [ ] had been on loan to the Cable Secretariat for 15 months, and FE wanted him to return for an operational assignment. With [ ] away it was not feasible for [ ] to leave the Secretariat immediately, but in November he did begin to divide his working day between FE and the Secretariat. He spent the morning hours in the Secretariat drafting a [ ]

[ ] which he wanted to complete before returning to FE. In the afternoons he

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read files and reports in preparation for his new

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assignment. [ ] completed the drafting of the

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[ ] regulation in late December, and on 22 January

1954 he officially returned to FE Division. On

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31 January 1954 [ ] as Deputy

Cable Secretary, and on the same date [ ]

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moved into the Executive Officer position.

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#### IV. The Cable Reduction Program

##### A. Studies, Proposals, and Experiments

##### 1. The Inspector General Study

As noted earlier, although the DCI's notice requesting a 25-percent reduction in cable traffic was issued in April 1953, by the end of the year no real progress had been made. The Inspector General (IG), Lyman Kirkpatrick, described the situation succinctly in February 1954:

Since the promulgation of the DCI's Notice in April re cable traffic, there has been little substantive accomplishment in reducing cable traffic per se, nor has there been any discernable pattern amongst the relationships, either increase or decrease, of number of cables, total group-count of cables and number of dispatches. During the period concerned, the only discernable factor is that there appears to be a minor lessening of total volume of the three elements concerned, i.e., cables, group-counts and dispatches continue to fluctuate with no relationship. 85/

Earlier in 1954 Kirkpatrick had appointed a committee to study the problem and to come up with a staff study that would recommend solutions; the committee was composed of senior officers of the IG Staff, the

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DDA, the DDP, the Office of Communications (OC), and the Cable Secretariat. 86/ On 8 February Kirkpatrick called a meeting of the committee; the draft of the staff study was presented and discussed. 87/  the Secretariat representative at the meeting, said that he concurred generally with the findings and recommendations of the study but had some reservations. These he made specific in an 11 February memorandum to the IG. 88/ He said that he did not believe that further notice on the reduction of cables should be issued over the DCI's signature; rather, he suggested, "we implement specific plans by which we can comply with his 17 April 1953 directive. If all possible means result in failure, then it may be necessary to issue some new directive in the name of the Director."\*

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Apparently Kirkpatrick was convinced that to get the job done the authority of the Director was needed -- even though that authority had already been exercised; and on 19 February he sent to the Director

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\*  a career military officer, was reluctant to violate a time-honored military command principle: a commanding officer does not repeat a written order; it is the responsibility of his staff to see that the order is carried out.

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the completed staff study under a memorandum that stated:

Inasmuch as the major volume of cable traffic emanates from the DD/P organization, it is planned, subject to your approval of this staff study, to furnish DD/P with various amounts of material gathered in the course of compiling these recommendations, such material perhaps being of additional value to him in trying to accomplish the desired reduction. 89/

No doubt this paragraph in the IG's cover memorandum was intended to make it clear to the Director that the DDP had been the major culprit in the failure to reduce cable traffic. The same point was made indirectly in the section of the staff study itself that established the facts bearing on the problem:

The reduction of cable traffic volume must be attacked on a three-fold basis: (a) the elimination of non-essential cable traffic and using the dispatch medium therefore; (b) practicing the greatest economy of words for those messages deemed essential for cable communications; (c) elimination to the greatest degree possible of "book" and "multiple addressee" cables, principally of the "info" variety.

The IG's staff study also informed the DCI that two additional studies of the problem were in progress -- one by OC designed to produce statistics on the originators of cable traffic, and one by the Management Improvement Staff (MIS) designed to evaluate the

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feasibility of using "pouchgrams" instead of cables.

The IG's study recommended that certain responsibilities be assigned to the DDP, the DDA, the AD/CO, and the Cable Secretariat and specified those responsibilities. The final recommendation was:

That within ninety days of the approval of this study that if there is not accomplished a sizeable reduction of cable traffic, that the DCI instruct the Cable Secretary to establish maximum quotas on a word-count basis for the various units of organization which will represent the required 25% reduction in traffic below the level of April 1953. The establishment of such maximum quotas will not preclude the right to exceed any given quota based on demonstrated operational necessity. [\*]

The DCI approved the IG staff study recommendations on 1 March 1954, and the components charged with specific responsibilities began to go through the process of meeting them -- some assiduously and some *pro forma* -- with, as is noted later, dubious results.\*\*

2. The Management Improvement Staff Study

Meanwhile, the MIS study of a possible pouchgram procedure referred to in the IG study was in

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\* This badly over-stated threat was never carried out, of course; the last sentence effectively pulled any teeth that the threat was intended to have.

\*\* See below, p. 90.

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progress, and on 18 March 1954 it was officially presented to the Cable Secretariat. 90/

The study contained 11 closely packed pages of facts, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations; there were 22 attachments containing statistical data -- including that developed by the OC study mentioned in the IG's study, charts, diagrams, and dispatch forms used by other Government departments and agencies. In substance the study recommended that pouchgram procedures should be used only if all other efforts to reduce cable traffic failed. [ ] discussed the study with Hulick, EO/DDP, and they agreed that they didn't like the negative approach of the MIS recommendation and that the pouchgram procedure should be given a trial run with two or three principle<sup>a</sup> overseas stations. The pouchgram they had in mind was "a form of communication written on a cable form, using cable language, coordinated, released, and distributed as a cable, but sent to the field by pouch." 91/ [ ] designed a procedure for pouchgram processing, which Hulick and [ ] the AD/CO, approved; and Hulick recommended that the [ ] stations be used in the test run. After considerable discussion among

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25X1 the elements concerned, primarily the Secretariat and the DDP area divisions, the plan was completed; it was approved by [ ] on 31 August 1954. 92/

3. The DDP Study -- the "Fast Pouch"

25X1 In the meantime the DDP had developed a refinement on the pouchgram procedure. On 13 August 1954 the DCI, in a meeting with his deputies, again expressed his concern about the volume of cable traffic, requested remedial action, and approved the [ ] for improved courier service to the major Agency stations in Western Europe. 93/

On 24 August the DDP sent to the DCI a staff-study memorandum that incorporated the [ ] Hulick plan and recommended:

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25X1 1. That the Chief, Registry be authorized to [ ] will provide the Agency with Daily except Sunday and Monday pouches between Headquarters and [ ] with next day delivery for a trial period of six months at a cost not to exceed \$1,938 per week based on CIA proportionate use of this service.

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2. That the Chief of Registry, Cable Secretary and the Assistant Director of Communications arrange for the necessary implementing action in Headquarters and the field.

The DDP memorandum -- signed by Helms, the DDP/COPS, for the DDP -- was concurred in by the DDA, White;

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the ADCO, [REDACTED]  
and the DDCI, Cabell.

Before signing his approval, the DCI, Dulles, made an addition to the second recommendation: "and report to the DCI at the end of the six months' trial whether this system should be continued." Dulles approved the recommendations on 11 October 1954. 94/

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Between that time and the end of January 1955 [REDACTED] were worked out in detail, and personnel both at headquarters and the three overseas stations were thoroughly indoctrinated. The first westward fast-pouch courier flight was on 11 February 1955; the first eastward flight was on 15 February. 95/

From the beginning of the experiment the Cable Secretary furnished Hulick with a pouchgram weekly count, and the chief of RID furnished him with the weight of each pouch to and from the three overseas stations. On the basis of these data Hulick informed the area divisions and the three senior representatives overseas of their week-to-week performance in terms of percentages of routine cables diverted to pouch and the average pouch weights for the courier flights.

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At the end of the first two weeks of the experiment, Hulick advised the stations by pouchgram that "Results Fast Pouch Service to date disappointing in that we are not approaching maximum use this facility by diverting routine precedence cable traffic to Fast Pouch," and he asked all releasing officers to make a greater effort to increase diversion. 96/

On 1 April 1955 an additional courier flight each way was added, providing six trips each week instead of five, but by the end of the tenth week of the experiment the results were still disappointing.

After the twelfth week Helms sent to the chiefs of the area divisions and the senior representatives involved in the trial run a memorandum summarizing the results of the test up to that time and asked each of them for his views on whether or not the experiment should be continued. 97/

The responses were uniformly in favor of continuation, but some of them pointed out that there were problems -- for example, the distance of the

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By the end of May there had been little improvement, but both the DDP and the Cable Secretary were optimistic about the future. Wisner, the DDP, sent to the Director a memorandum that said, in effect, that all concerned in the pouchgram project agreed that the experiment had proved to be successful and recommended that it be continued. 98/ Apparently the Director had been watching the weekly records maintained by Hulick, and he took no action on Wisner's recommendation. He had made a decision, however, and on 26 July, 24 weeks after the trial run had been started, cables went to [ ] and

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[ ] announcing discontinuance of the fast pouch service, effective 30 July. 99/

On the following day, 27 July, discontinuance of the fast pouch service was announced by [ ]

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[ ] 100/ which reminded releasing officials that they should still use dispatches in preference to cables and deferred cables in preference to those of higher precedence.

The discontinuance of the fast pouch service appeared to be fully justified. Despite the great

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efforts of the DDP, the DDS,\* and the Cable Secretariat, the volume of cable traffic had continued to rise. By July 1955, a year after the fast pouch service had been proposed and six months after it had been put into effect, cable volume had reached 16,000 a month -- a 25 percent increase over the July 1954 volume.\*\* The fast pouch service was an experiment that failed, but the effort to reduce cable volume continued.

B. Pouching Cables to Information Addressees\*\*\*

1. The [ ] Pouch Procedure

About five months before the Fast Pouch experiment had actually started, another cable-reduction

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\* The Deputy Director for Administration (DDA), had been re-designated the Deputy Director for Support (DDS) on 3 February 1955.

\*\* The monthly cable volume continued to rise thereafter. For March 1956 it was 18,100; for March 1957 it was 18,300; and for March 1958 it was 19,100.

\*\*\* The undocumented statements in this section are based on the Cable Secretariat's monthly reports covering the period.

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25X1 device, the [ ] Pouch procedure, was initiated. The IG's study of February 1954 had emphasized the need for eliminating to the greatest degree possible book and multiple addressee cables, particularly "INFO" addressees. In his 11 February 1954 memoran-

25X1 dum to the IG, [ ] identified "INFO" addressees as constituting about 40 percent of the total cable volume handled by the Signal Center, citing [ ] the chief of the Center, as the source of this estimate. 25X1

25X1 [ ]  
25X1 [ ] then in the process of formal coordination, contained a provision for pouching copies of cables to "INFO" addressees and that this category of cables offered the greatest potential for achieving a major reduction in cable volume.

The procedure for pouching copies of cables for information addressees was simple, and for cable originators it posed no burden other than that of making a decision that one or more of the information addressees of his cable should receive copies by pouch channels. Once he had made this decision, all labor involved in the preparation of the sterilized copies, the delivery of them to RI, the pouching

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to the field, and delivery to the addressee would be done for him by the Secretariat, RI, and the signal centers overseas. By this procedure multiple addressee cables would be prepared in the usual form, except for showing as additional information specifically which addressees would be furnished sterilized copies of the cable by pouch -- for example, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

For each station indicated as a pouch addressee the Cable Secretariat would furnish to the Dispatch and Pouch Section of RI two copies of the cable, properly sterilized for pouching. This procedure was established to be effective 1 September 1954 by

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[REDACTED]

to become effective on the same day. The notices established the indicator [REDACTED] to identify envelopes containing cables to information addressees; this was intended to facilitate the handling of the material in regular dispatch channels and to signify that upon receipt at its destination the envelope was to be delivered to the signal center for normal cable accounting and numbering and then was to be

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delivered to the addressees.

This procedure provided originators with a relatively easy means of diverting a major portion of cable volume to pouch channels -- if they could make the decision to use it. For example, a 200-word multiple addressee cable to an action addressee and to three information addressees -- counted as four cables in the Signal Center -- generated 800 groups of cryptographic transmission. Simply by specifying VIA POUCH for information addressees, the originator could reduce Signal Center transmission by 600 words, 75 percent of the total. With the Secretariat furnishing RI with the sterilized copies for delivery to the addressee, it is hard to understand why the procedure never proved to be effective in reducing cable volume. During the first five months that the procedure was in effect -- from September 1954 through January 1955 -- the Cable Secretariat processed 60,500 cables, of which less than 150 were diverted to pouch by the  procedure.

## 2. Revision of the Procedure

After the activation of the Fast Pouch procedure in March 1955, no one bothered to count the small number of cables diverted to pouch channels through

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25X1 use of the [ ] procedure. Meanwhile, cable volume continued to rise for six consecutive months. From 15,000 in March it had reached an all-time high of 17,800 in August 1955; this was an increase of 63 percent, or 6,900 cables more than in August 1954. The Cable Secretariat's monthly cable count was derived from the simple method of recording the number of DIR numbers and IN numbers used during the month. Each number used was counted as one cable regardless of the number of addressees; but each addressee was counted as a transmission in the Signal Center, and true cable volume was two or three times the figures recorded in the Secretariat.

During the two weeks immediately following the discontinuance of the Fast Pouch service, a count of cables diverted to the [ ] pouch showed that out of 8,000 cables processed during those two weeks there were but six cables pouched from headquarters and three received by pouch from the field. Using the [ ] procedure for lateral exchange, however, the field had done considerably better; that count was 46 pouched cables for a total of 12,500 words. [ ] gave these figures to Hulick and recommended that the [ ] procedure be discontinued. On 25 August 1955

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Hulick sent [ ] figures to [ ] with a recommendation that existing procedures be revised to "permit the continuance of [ ] for lateral exchanges in the field and that it be discontinued for traffic to and from Headquarters."

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On 21 October 1955 [ ] concurred in this recommendation, and the revision of the procedure was accomplished by rescinding [ ] outright and by modifying [ ] with notification to the field that the procedure would thereafter apply only when the information addressee was another field station, and that when DIR was an information addressee the cable would be sent to headquarters by electrical means.

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### 3. The Education of Cable Writers

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When [ ] approved the rescission of the [ ] procedure for headquarters, he said he believed that the procedure was workable but "the lack of continued re-education of cable writers had resulted in its gradual disuse to the point where it was no longer practical to continue it." 101/ His comment was brought to the attention of the Director of Training, Matthew Baird, and in the spring of 1956

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a course called "Cable Writing" was initiated as a joint venture of the Office of Training, the Office of Communications, and the DDP -- [ ]

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[ ] then chief of SE Division, was the DDP representative.

The Deputy Directors saw to it that everyone concerned with cables enrolled in the course. Classes were large; there were more than a hundred people in each running of the course. [ ] chief of the Signal Center, and members of his watch officer staff opened the course with a number of illustrations of how plain text was converted letter-by-letter into a cipher text, and examples were given showing how careless wording and the use of unauthorized abbreviations and contractions added unnecessary words to the cables. The course closed with [ ] giving a discourse on the principles of clear and concise writing.

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Assuming that the cable writing course would accomplish its purpose, Hulick, the EO/DDP, proposed in May 1956 that the [ ] procedure be reestablished for headquarters use. 102/ [ ] agreed to try it again for three months, and the procedure was

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reinstated on 1 June 1956. 103/ The three-month test ran from 6 June through 4 September, and it proved conclusively that, despite the reeducation of the cable writers, the [ ] procedure was still an ineffective means of reducing cable traffic.

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During the test about 2 percent of 14,200 outgoing cables were diverted to pouch. [ ] observed that, with few exceptions, 95 percent of the diverted cables were less than 60 words in length and that the savings to the Signal Center were very small in terms of group count. He told Hulick that he was content to let the procedure continue, as it was reducing at least that much of the Signal Center's encode-decode workload.\* 104/

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#### 4. The Second Management Staff Study

The cable writing course provided by the Office of Training (OTR) with the support of the Signal Center

\* The [ ] procedure continued, with little change in volume diverted, until 17 April 1970, when it was again rescinded for headquarters use for much the same reasons as before. At that time field stations were diverting a substantial volume of Intelligence Information cables -- average length about 500 to 600 words -- laterally to information addressees by the [ ] procedure.

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continued for the next few years, and OTR augmented the course by including cable writing instruction in other courses -- the Operations Support Course, the Operations Course, and the Operations Familiarization Course. In spite of this effort, however, in March 1958 new all-time highs were reached in both cable count (19,100 cables) and group count (about 7,500,000 words), and the Management Staff was again directed to study and find solutions to "Excessive-Unwarranted Cable Traffic." 105/

This Management Staff study was even more comprehensive than the one made on the pouchgram procedure in 1954. 106/ It contained more than 50 pages of facts, discussion, charts and graphs, and a single recommendation:

that there be established on the T/O of the Executive Officer[\*] of the DCI, and physically located in the Office of the Cable Secretariat, a position to be known as the Cable Control Officer. This position should be established for a six-month trial period and it will be the duty of the individual assigned to:

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\* On 1 July 1957, [ ] the DCI's Executive Assistant, was redesignated the DCI's Executive Officer, with responsibility for coordination of the staff actions in CIA.

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- (1) Examine daily, on a post-mortem basis, incoming and outgoing cables disseminated by the Cable Secretariat to determine the nature, extent, and frequency of infractions of existing cable regulations.
- (2) Prepare more precise regulations regarding the use and preparation of cables where present regulations fail to provide clear, understandable prohibitions to the originating offices.
- (3) Record and report to the Deputy Directors concerned all instances in which there are clear-cut violations of regulations covering the use and preparation of cables.
- (4) Advise the Office of Training of those areas wherein it appears most profit could occur from training emphasis.
- (5) Keep informed as to the trends in cable traffic through close liaison with the Signal Center, Office of Communications, and the Cable Secretariat in order to assist in the imposition of temporary restrictions wherever necessary.

Provision was made that the individual selected should be fully cleared and should be acceptable to the DDP, the DDS, and the DDI. The study was addressed to the DCI through the DDS and was sent forward to the DDS on 16 October 1958. The DDS indicated his concurrence in the recommendation on 22 November 1958 and nominated  - by that time transferred from his position as chief of the Signal Center to the job of deputy chief of the Americas Division of OC -- for the position of cable control officer.

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25X1 Cabell also concurred and recommended that

[ ] be appointed. 107/

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In [ ] final discussion with members of

the Management Staff before they issued the study, it was understood that they intended to suggest that he,

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[ ] wear the additional hat of cable control officer. He had made it clear that because the duties of the position duplicated so many of his own as Cable Secretary, he was doubtful that establishing another title or position was the best approach to the problem. He was certain that if the position were established, the DDP would consider that in order to be effective the person in the job would have to be an operations officer in the DDP chain of command. [ ] told [ ] that in spite of these misgivings he would go along with the proposal provided that the person was not located in his office and did not look to him for a major portion of his support. 108/

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Kirkpatrick, the IG, commented on the study to the effect that it was doubtful that the establishment of the position of cable control officer would achieve a substantial reduction in cable traffic. He also

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said that without grave reservations he could not support the philosophy expressed in the study that "discipline, to be respected and most effective, should come from outside the organization being disciplined." He believed that the Deputy Directors had the authority to exercise what discipline was necessary and certainly were capable of doing so. . . The need was not for more policing but for a greater concentration on the elimination of unnecessary reporting by cable and in further improvement in pouch service. 109/

Amory, the DDI, saw no objection to establishing the new position on a temporary basis provided that it was clearly understood that the officer would have authority to act only in an advisory capacity after the actual release of cable traffic and would have no command or review authority before the release of cable traffic. 110/

Bissell,\* the DDP, stated that

it seems to me that we do not need more regulations, nor more enforcers of regulations.

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\* Frank Wisner, the DDP, was succeeded by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., on 1 January 1959.

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I agree with [ ] opinion that the basic reason for excessive cable traffic is a lack of real interest in the subject all along the line.

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He then quoted from [ ] note to him:

Anyone appointed to this job would have to be so senior and so experienced that he would surely be needed more elsewhere. He would have to swing a great deal of weight on strictly operational questions to be effective -- e.g. in attacking abuses of PP Staff's long guidance cables as too many addressees, he would have to know which stations are likely to use the guidance, and which customarily ignore it, and why.

To keep up a correspondence with the field on this subject (where the abuses are greatest) would require not one man but a staff, probably steadily increasing in accordance with Parkinson's Law. Even ignoring the field, this proposal means too much paper work -- a report on every infraction (and presumably a rebuttal and a counter-rebuttal, and meetings, etc.), a monthly report to the DCI (would he read it?, more reports to Deputies, Staff, and Division Chiefs, etc.)

Bissell said that he did not mean to recommend that we do nothing and that he understood that finding acceptable substitutes for cables was progressing on two fronts, teletape and better handling of regular dispatches, and he thought that priority attention should be given in that field. 111/ Apparently the DCI agreed with Kirkpatrick, Bissell, and others, for he did not approve the recommendation to establish the position of cable control officer. 112/

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C. Cable Regulations and Handbooks

In February 1954 the formal coordination of [ ]

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proposed [ ]

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[ ] -- he had finished it in September 1953 --  
was returned to the Cable Secretariat for negotiation  
of the qualified concurrences of six offices, each  
of which wanted some major or minor change in the  
text. Because of the pressure on the Secretariat to  
produce a "how-to-do-it" handbook,\* and because so much  
of the proposed regulation was handbook material, the  
Cable Secretary decided that the document should be  
separated into two publications -- a regulation  
containing only material that was regulatory in its  
scope, and a cable handbook containing all of the  
essential procedural material in [ ] draft.

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[ ] took on this task, working on the  
changes proposed by the six offices and on the  
division of material. The reorganization was com-  
pleted in March; and after informal coordination with  
the offices concerned, the revised draft of the regu-  
lation was returned to the Regulations Control Staff  
for formal coordination.

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\* See above, pp. 48-49.

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In the revision of [ ] the subject was changed to [ ] and the text was reduced to a half dozen pages of policy statements, largely those established in [ ] of October 1952. The revision was approved by White, the DDS, on 12 June and published on 25 June 1954. 113/

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The proposed handbook was an unusual document.

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[ ] chief of the Regulations Control Staff, agreed -- albeit reluctantly -- to permit the [ ] to be printed in color, an exception to the standard black-and-white printing of regulatory publications. Near the end of September the handbook, which was dated 25 June 1954, was distributed to offices throughout the Agency. It had a bright red, white, and blue cover, it was bound in spiral plastic, and certain pages contained graphic illustrations, made by the visual aids staff of the Office of Logistics, in three colors to emphasize the importance of the text.\*

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\* See Figure 5, p. 106. Also see [ ] for a copy of the handbook.

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## Figure 5


COMMUNICATIONS  
25 June 1954

Excerpt from [REDACTED]

## SECTION I

## CABLE WRITING TECHNIQUES

1. Cultivating Techniques. - The ability to write a good cable, one which is clear, concise and accurate is not an inherent ability-- rather it is an ability cultivated through adherence to sound practices and through close attention to detail. In most instances, preparation of a cable in draft form and careful editing of the draft are essential if the cable is to be both clear and concise.



2. Cables vs Pouch. - When it has been determined that some form of communication must be sent to the field, the writer should consider whether a cable is the best form of communication to be used. He should consider whether the matter might not be handled satisfactorily by pouch,

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In October 1958 a revised edition of the cable handbook was published. The section on the Cable Secretariat had been expanded to include detailed descriptions of the processing of DDI suspense items. This was essentially the same procedure described in

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TO DD/I, dated 2 July 1954, in which the suspense time allowed for area divisions to dispose of suspense cables had been reduced from six to three hours. In the 1958 edition the suspense time had again been reduced -- from three to two hours. Increased pressure to meet the two-hour limit was put upon area divisions by the following instructions for the Cable Secretary's disposal of DDI suspense items:

- (1) File, on advice from the Deputy Director (Plans) (or his designee) that the cable *cannot* be released to DD/I.
- (2) By direction of the Deputy Director (Plans) (or his designee), release to DD/I the cable as received or modified, as appropriate, to remove sensitive operational data and source.
- (3) Failing receipt of advice or direction (as set forth in either subparagraphs (1) or (2) immediately above), release the cable or the modified version thereof, as appropriate, to DD/I upon expiration of the two-hour suspense.

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The Cable Secretary was never forced to exercise this new authority. To insure that the deadlines were met, [ ] instructed his cable duty officers to monitor the times closely and to inform Hulick, the DDP Executive Officer, fifteen minutes before the expiration of suspense time. This procedure worked out very well; within a very few minutes after making such calls the items were promptly cleared for release, modification, or denial by the reports officer concerned, who either telephoned or came in person to the Cable Secretariat.

On 14 January 1956 the DCI had issued a memorandum for the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS on "Organization of the Clandestine Services," which rescinded Smith's 15 July 1952 memorandum on the same subject. In the January 1956 memorandum the DCI reaffirmed that "The Deputy Director (Plans) is the Director's Deputy and channel for the direction and control of CIA clandestine activities." It also reaffirmed the provision that "Release by, or with the authority of, DCI, DD/P, or the appropriate Chief of the Clandestine Services operating division is required for all outgoing overseas cables and dispatches."

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Exceptions to this requirement were cables bearing "Special Indicators," and these were to be issued solely by the DDP -- in appropriate situations at the request of other Deputy Directors -- in order to control the distribution and reduce the coordination of sensitive and specialized material. Such indicators would clearly designate the office or offices to which such material would be distributed and limited, including the Clandestine Services area division having responsibility for the station concerned. 114/

The 1958 edition of the cable handbook contained a listing of the "Special Indicators," which had been issued in February 1956 by the DDP to the DDI and the DDS and to their subordinate offices. These special indicators permitted certain exceptions to normal releasing channels at headquarters and indicated origination and release by other than a DDP component.\* Use of the special indicators by field installations

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\* The conditions under which Agency components use special indicators have never been changed, but a number of additional offices have been assigned such indicators as they were established in the organization of the Agency -- for example, the DDR (later DDS&T) and its component offices. 115/

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did not imply release by other than the chief of station or base. The special indicators also served to reduce coordination on sensitive and special cables at the originating installations and assisted in the control of dissemination, at both the originating and addressee stations. 116/

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V. Development of the Teletype  
Dissemination System

A. Cable Secretariat Support

1. Preliminary Dissemination

One of the major tasks of the Cable Secretariat was the processing of Preliminary Disseminations (PD's), a product of the reports officers in the DDP area divisions. The primary responsibility of these officers was the preparation of CIA Information Reports (IR's) for formal dissemination to the intelligence community. For the most part, the IR's were based on incoming cables, and after they were prepared by the reports officers, they were sent to the Reports Control Section of the FI Staff, which validated and logged them and then sent them on to the Printing Services Division (PSD) of the Office of Logistics (OL) for reproduction and delivery by courier mail to the members of the community -- a process that took at least three days and sometimes as many as six.

This time lapse between receipt of the cable and dissemination of the information contained in the cable

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was acceptable for routine information, but there was some information that required immediate dissemination. That was the function of the PD's.

The area division reports officers prepared PD's on a special form and sent them to the Secretariat, where they were processed as outgoing cables and passed on to the signal center for transmission to State, Army, Navy, Air, NSA, JCS, and SECDEF, and to OCI.

The Secretariat's processing of PD's was much more complicated than the standard processing of outgoing cables. After the Signal Center's transmission of the PD's, the original copy was returned to the Secretariat for retyping and distribution within the Agency. This involved the reproduction of copies, the assignment of distribution symbols for DDP components, the return to the originator for sterilization, and thereafter the reproduction and dissemination of the sterilized copies for non-DDP units.

25X1 In the summer of 1954 the Secretariat was processing an average of 300 PD's a month, and in September the Cable Secretary,  decided to launch his

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own cable reduction program by simplifying the handling of PD's. He induced the FI Requirements Staff to change the one-ply PD form to a multiple-copy form similar to the Secretariat's outgoing cable form. This provided a Ditto master, which eliminated the retyping and proofing in the Secretariat, provided a transmission copy for the Signal Center, and made possible the Secretariat's distribution concurrently with Signal Center transmission. In October 1954, area division reports officers began preparing PD's on the standard outgoing cable forms -- it would take some time for the new PD forms to be printed, and the Secretariat was able to furnish Agency components with finished copies within an hour or so of the time of filing for transmission.

The speed-up in the processing of PD's soon led to an agreement that the Signal Center would transmit only PRIORITY PD's, and ROUTINE PD's would be processed for courier delivery -- an arrangement that reduced the Signal Center's workload by about 100,000 groups of electrical transmissions per month. 117/\*

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\* The undocumented statements in this section are based on Cable Secretariat Monthly Reports covering this period.

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During October 1954 a total of 306 PD's were processed, and 275 of these were diverted to courier delivery. The volume of PD's continued to rise thereafter, and by June 1955 it reached more than 400 a month and a year later more than 500 a month. It was in June 1956 that there came a major change in the system of disseminating PD's to the intelligence community.

2. Teletype Dissemination

On 4 June 1956 the Preliminary Dissemination category of information reports was abolished and replaced by the Teletype Dissemination (TD). 118/ The members of the intelligence community were so informed

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The job of the reproduction and distribution of a "sufficient number of copies to satisfy needs formerly met by the followup" fell to the Secretariat. Deliveries were made to the Departments of State and Defense by Secretariat couriers, and the Office of Central Reference was provided with enough copies of the TD's to complete the distribution, including that to US Government agencies that were recipients of CIA information reports on certain subjects but were not normally addressees -- for example, Treasury, Agriculture, and Immigration. The Secretariat soon found that the hectograph equipment used to reproduce copies of TD's was not capable of turning out enough clear copies to meet the need, so offset printing equipment was procured. The TD and cable forms were revised and printed on offset masters, and by the end of 1956 the offset system was firmly established.

In the meantime, however, the volume of TD's had risen to the point where the Secretariat had to have help. The volume in June 1956, when the TD replaced the PD, was 575; by October it had increased to more than 900 -- that was the time of the Hungarian and Mid-East crises. Early in November  asked Hulick,

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the EO/DDP, for more manpower 120/; Hulick recognized [ ] problem, set the administrative machinery in motion, and almost immediately the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS each assigned a man to TDY with the Cable Secretariat. The men were sorely needed, for during November the Cable Secretariat reproduced and disseminated [ ]

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[ ] By the end of the first week in December the introduction of the offset printing system and the easing of the Hungarian and Mid-East crises reduced the workload somewhat, and the DDP and DDI men were released to their offices; the DDS man liked the work and was transferred to an available slot in the Cable Secretariat T/O.

A significant factor in the development of the Secretariat's capability to handle the TD reproduction and dissemination was the adoption of three employee suggestions. All three of the suggestions had been submitted during the period from March through

[ ]

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August 1955, but the process of evaluating them for granting incentive awards took some time; and they were not worked into the Secretariat system until after June 1956 when the TD's replaced the PD's.

During the 1956 October-to-December crisis period, however, they were in effect, and in April 1957 an evaluation group composed of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] chief of the  
Records Management Staff, summarized the tangible

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benefits of adoption of the suggestions:

Since adopting the new "TD" (Teletype Dissemination) System stimulated by these three employee suggestions, the reporting workload has been cut almost in half. (Tab G). A considerably curtailed teletype transmission, supplemented or supplanted by a single, more extensive (dittoed originally, now multilithed) hard copy dissemination by Cable Secretariat, now suffices to get this "Hot" information reported to the policy making and all other working levels of the intelligence community in a timely manner. Unnecessary and duplicate handling, readings, extractions, filings and references are eliminated. Backlogs of routine CS reports have been reduced and better quality finished intelligence reports are now being written with corresponding improvements in customer services. Reports Officers now have more time to devote to such essentials and sometimes previously neglected Intelligence Officer functions as: developing requirements, directing field collection efforts, and providing guidance to field personnel in producing more pertinent, accurate and complete reports.

Incentive awards totaling \$8,500 were granted to

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the four people who made the three suggestions -- two people submitted one of them jointly. The DCI presented the awards checks to

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B. Improving the System

1. Expanding the Courier Service

Although the diversion of the dissemination of routine TD's from electrical transmission to courier delivery achieved a major reduction in the workload of the Signal Center, priority TD's still had to be teletyped to the members of the intelligence community. There were four courier deliveries to State and the Pentagon each day, but priority TD's required faster service. As the total volume of TD's increased steadily, so did the Signal Center's workload; and on 4 June 1958, two years after the initiation of the TD system, the courier deliveries were increased to nine each day -- one each hour beginning at 0800. 121/ This made it possible to divert the day-time priority TD's to the courier system and thus relieve the Signal Center of all TD transmissions during the day.

In July 1958 the Iraq and Lebanon crises, coming almost simultaneously, generated a sharp rise in both

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cable and TD traffic; and to relieve the Signal Center of the burden of night transmission of TD's, the courier service was expanded to provide night delivery on an every-two-hour schedule. Thereafter only the most urgent TD's were transmitted -- and there were very few of them. The result was that in July 1958, 91.5 percent of a total of [ ] TD's were delivered by courier; in August it was 98 percent [ ] and in October it reached 99.07 percent [ ]

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In terms of workload savings to the Signal Center, the June 1956 diversion of routine TD's to courier delivery saved the Center about 16 hours a day of cryptographic transmission 122/; the expansion of the courier service in June and July 1958 reduced the Center's group count [ ]

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## 2. Standardizing Distribution

From the beginning of the TD system, distribution was a joint responsibility of the OCR\* Documents Division (OCR/DD) and the Cable Secretariat. The Secretariat furnished OCR/DD with 25 sterilized copies

\* On 12 August 1955 the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) was re-designated the Office of Central Reference (OCR). 123/

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of each TD, and OCR/DD distributed them among the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), the Office of National Estimates (ONE), [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Office of Training (OTR), the US Information Agency (USIA), and other CIA and non-CIA addressees indicated by the originator of each TD. The Secretariat distributed TD's within the Agency to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDI, the DDI Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the DDP, and the staffs and divisions within the DDP complex; it also distributed to State, Defense,\* and NSA.

On 18 August 1958 [REDACTED] chief of OCR/DD, sent to the Cable Secretary a memorandum in which he recommended that the Secretariat take over OCR/DD's TD distribution function. He pointed out that the OCR/DD distribution was routine, governed by a standing list of addressees and other addressees listed by the originator of each TD. To save time and duplication of effort, he said, "it is requested

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\* Actually, distribution was made only to Army Staff Communications, which reproduced the TD's and sent copies to ACSI, Navy, Air, the JCS, and SECDEF.

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that your office accomplish the standard distribution and distribution to the addressees indicated at the bottom of each report which is presently done by this Division." 124/ On 19 August [ ]

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[ ] deputy, sent [ ] memorandum along to [ ] chief of FI, [ ] with the notation that the Secretariat would be happy to go along with the request if [ ] approved and would authorize certain procedural changes in the preparation of TD's. 125/ The changes would require reports officers to indicate on the transmittal page of the TD form a standard DDP dissemination and on the TD itself the pre-determined non-DDP distribution. These changes would eliminate a large part of the Secretariat's processing chores.

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About two months later -- on 20 October -- [ ] responded with a memorandum in which he said that he "fully agreed with the delegation of certain OCR responsibilities for distribution of TD reports to the Cable Secretary" as proposed by [ ] 126/ To the memorandum he attached a copy of FI, [ ] Memorandum No. 555, addressed to Area Division Chief Reports Officers and authorizing the changes

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suggested by the Secretariat. The effective date was to be 21 October 1958. On 21 October [ ] informed [ ] that the Secretariat would assume responsibility for the total distribution of TD's. 127/

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By December 1958 the Secretariat had proved that it could handle the job. In a 15 December memorandum [ ] the EO/DCI, the chief of FI, [ ] [ ] commended the Cable Secretary and his staff for their successful efforts in speeding the delivery of CS information reports to the intelligence community.

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[ ] said that since 21 October the Secretariat had relieved OCR of almost all responsibility for the distribution of [ ] reports and at the same time had cut the processing time in half. The memorandum went on to say:

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This example is, however, only one in a long series in which Cable Secretariat personnel have contributed very materially to the improvement of the Washington distribution system. We are constantly impressed by their dedication to duty and the imagination and initiative they have applied to problems which very directly affect the usefulness of CS intelligence information. 128/

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VI. Management Staff Studies, 1955 - 1958

A. Table of Organization, May 1955

The steady increase in cable traffic throughout the 1955-1958 period, the introduction of the Fast Pouch procedure in February 1955, the growth of the Preliminary Dissemination problem in 1955 and early 1956, and the establishment of the Teletype Dissemination system in June 1956 were bound to have a major impact on the Secretariat's manpower resources and to raise questions about the efficiency of the Secretariat's operations. The result was that five Management Staff studies of Secretariat activities were done during the period from May 1955 through February 1958.\*

The first study during the period was conducted in April and May 1955 in response to the Cable Secretary's 9 March request for an increase in his T/O. 129/

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\* The March 1958 study of "Excessive, Unwarranted Cable Traffic," discussed in some detail earlier, was not primarily a study of Cable Secretariat activities.' See p. 98, ff.

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25X1 [ ] asked for [ ] cable analyst 25X1  
25X1 supervisors, [ ] clerk typist supervisors, [ ] 25X1  
GS-04 clerk typists, and one GS-04 courier. To  
25X1 support his request, [ ] cited a ten-percent  
increase in cable volume, the heavy workload  
involved in sterilizing cables for the fast-pouch  
trial run, and the growth in the volume of PD's. His  
request stated that

A sincere and conscientious effort has been made to cover the positions involved by diverting personnel from other activities. It has been determined that such diversion is no longer feasible. 130/

The Management Staff study was completed late in April 1955, and on 12 May [ ] was informed that the chief of the staff, [ ] had approved the T/O increase and had forwarded his recommendation through concurrence channels to the DDS, White. 131/ After concurrence by [ ] the EO/DCI, the Budget Division, and the Director of Personnel, White gave his approval on 23 May. 132/

Because of the complications of the three-shift, seven-day work week of the Secretariat, the Management Staff examiners had taken a close look at absenteeism and unnecessary routines that might develop from

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improper distribution and work flow. They found that absenteeism was not excessive and that there were no questionable routines; among the conclusions of the study was the statement that

. . . discussion with the Cable Secretary gave every indication of prudent administration and an intelligent appreciation of recognized management practices acquired through past experience. 133/

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25X9 The increase [ ] positions gave the Secretariat a T/O of [ ] positions; but in August 1955, before the new positions were filled, an Agency-wide limit on personnel ceilings reduced the T/O to [ ] positions. 134/

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B. Proposed Merger with the Signal Center, October 1955

In September 1955 the DDS requested the chief of the Management Staff to make a study of the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center to determine the feasibility of merging them. [ ] was sent a copy of the DDS memorandum requesting the study, and he immediately informed [ ] that he would cooperate fully. Along with his offer of cooperation, however, went [ ] statement of his personal views on the proposed merger.

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25X1 He believed that the Secretariat was properly placed organizationally and that to merge its

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administrative functions with "the very important -- but totally unrelated -- technical function of the Signal Center . . . would be a step backward." He said that transfer of the Secretariat out of the Office of the Director would deny the Director and his Deputies the clear-cut and direct command channels that existed. In conclusion he said:

I believe that the office of the Cable Secretariat must remain a part of the Director's Office. It could not, in my opinion, function as efficiently as a part of any office other than that of the Director. 135/

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[ ] of the Management Staff did the feasibility study on the proposed merger, and near the end of October he told [ ] that he hoped to finish by 7 November. [ ] heard no more from

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[ ] thereafter, but on 16 November [ ] [ ] of the IG Staff visited [ ] in connection with an IG study of the Office of Communications.

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They discussed Secretariat-Signal Center relationships and functions, and [ ] told [ ] about his many discussions with [ ] -- including the last one in which the 7 November completion date had been established.

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[ ] heard no more from [ ] and heard nothing more about the Management Staff study. On 11 January 1956, however, [ ] IG study of Communications was issued, 136/ and [ ] learned that the IG study had included consideration of the Management Staff study and contained a statement to the effect that although the results of the Management Staff study had not been approved, it was understood that there would be a Management Staff recommendation that the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center be merged. The IG report went on to say that such a merger would be organizationally logical but it should be implemented in slow stages -- to permit the "already overloaded Signal Center Staff" to adjust to the consolidation. The IG study then recommended that

The DCI approve the consolidation of the Signal Center and the Agency Cable Secretariat/Message Center but that such consolidation, if approved by the DCI, be implemented gradually in such a manner that it will not impose an undue burden on the Chief and the Deputy Chief, Signal Center.

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On 17 February 1956 the Director of Communications, [ ] indicated his non-concurrence in the IG recommendation: "Do not concur at this time. The OC views have been passed to the Chief Management Staff

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in connection with the study made by his office." 137/

The D/OC's non-concurrence effectively killed the merger proposal, and the Cable Secretariat continued as a component of the Office of the Director.\*

C. The Second Table of Organization Study, April 1957

Although [ ] positions had been added to the T/O of the Cable Secretariat in August 1955, manpower continued to be a pressing problem; and in November 1956 the DDS requested a second Management Staff study of the personnel requirements of the Secretariat. The study actually did not begin until 22 April 1957.

[ ] chief of the Management Staff, then assigned [ ] to the job. [ ] finished the fact-finding phase in May, but it was not until 12 August that the study in final form was submitted to [ ] the EO/DCI. 139/

The study made three recommendations; the Management Staff believed that if these recommendations were approved and implemented, man-hour productivity could be increased and there would be no need for

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\* On 1 February 1972, however, the Cable Secretariat was transferred from the Office of the Director to the Office of Communications. 138/

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increasing the T/O of the Secretariat. [ ] and his staff considered the recommendations and decided that although none of them seemed likely to provide a significant increase in productivity, collectively they might diminish some of the manpower problems; so these recommendations were adopted:

- (1) Convert the two rotating shifts, the Day Shift and the Evening Shift, to straight shifts.
- (2) Establish a procedure for the periodic submission of individual production reports.
- (3) Meet increased work demands of a temporary nature, resulting from periods of international unrest, by activating "Situation Emergency."

The "Situation Emergency" plan was spelled out in the report. Generally it provided for the shifting of Secretariat personnel from routine jobs to activities affected by the emergency, the temporary use of cleared new employees from the Interim Assignment Section of O/Pers, the TDY assignment of people from other Agency components, and a sort of do-it-yourself system in cable distribution to the DDP components. In addition to the three recommendations, the Management Staff report contained a number of suggestions about minor changes in reporting and administrative procedures, most of which the Secretariat accepted.

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D. The Scheduled Overtime Study, July 1957

When the report of the second Management Staff study of the Secretariat's T/O was submitted on 12 August, the covering memorandum, signed by [ ] stated that

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During the course of the study, it was observed that the Cable Secretariat staffs its week-end shifts on an overtime basis. In order to determine whether this method of staffing represents the most efficient utilization of personnel and an economical expenditure of funds, the Cable Secretary in the interest of good management, has invited the Management Staff to review with him the problem of staffing over week-ends. This problem will be subject of a separate study. 140/

The "separate study" was actually begun before the other study was submitted. In July 1957 [ ]

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[ ] returned to the Secretariat to try to determine the answer to the question "Does the Cable Secretariat policy of scheduling overtime represent the most economical approach to meeting its present week-end staffing requirements?" The search for the answer was based on one assumption: "The elimination of scheduled overtime must result in a monetary savings" -- an assumption that appeared to be the answer to the question.

One must wonder whether or not [ ] was technically correct when he said that the Cable

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Secretary had "invited" the Management Staff to make a study of the overtime problem. [ ] had been struggling with the same question since he became Cable Secretary in 1952, and he had concluded that the answer to the question was "yes" and that the [ ] assumption was false.

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Several times over the years between 1952 and 1957 [ ] and his staff had studied the alternative to scheduled overtime -- the establishment of a staggered work-week, which would require the addition of a fourth shift to be manned by eight or ten additional employees. The mathematics of the studies always led to the same conclusion: the cost of the overtime was much less than the cost of the fourth platoon. The word "overtime," however, was a bad one in the Agency's management lexicon, so [ ] did not object to the Management Staff having a try at the problem.

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If he had -- and if his objection had been supported in high places -- he might have saved the Management Staff a lot of time and manpower. The study went on and was completed and submitted to the EO/DCI on 23 October 1957. 141/

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It was a very thorough study; the mathematical analysis was impeccable, and it inexorably led to the conclusion that the cost of the scheduled overtime was \$8,099.85 less than the cost of any alternative device. The single recommendation in the report of the study was that the Cable Secretariat continue the use of scheduled overtime. On 26 October , the EO/DCI, approved the recommendation. 142/

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E. Cable Secretariat-Signal Center Operations,  
February 1958

Although the proposal to combine the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center had been laid to rest in October 1955,\* apparently the DDS was not fully convinced that managerial effectiveness was best served by having two components in different directorates doing the same kind of work -- handling cable traffic.

In October 1957 he requested the Management Staff to examine Cable Secretariat and Signal Center operations and come up with the answer to a complex question:

Can any combination of functions, tasks, procedures or activities bring about a saving in

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\* See above, p. 128.

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manpower, and are certain refinements now carried on for the Office of the Director necessary? 143/

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[ ] assigned the study to [ ] a senior examiner on his staff. During the latter part of October and all of November [ ] virtually lived in the Secretariat and the Signal Center and observed and recorded the details of all of the procedures in both units. Then he devised a series of step-by-step flow charts covering the procedures, carefully coordinating everything with the chiefs and deputy chiefs of both components. He completed his report in January 1958, and on 7 February [ ] submitted the report to White, the DDS, who approved it on 11 February.

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The report described the investigative methods used, included the series of flow charts illustrating processing activities, and reached five specific conclusions -- all of which led to two recommendations:

- a. That the distribution of functions and activities of the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat remain as they are.
- b. That the question concerning procedural duplication between these components and the question concerning unnecessary refinements in Cable Secretariat service to the DCI be dismissed as being more seeming than real.

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F. Conclusions

25X1 Perhaps it should be noted at this point that of the five Management Staff studies of Cable Secretariat operations during the 1955-1958 period only one was positively productive -- the first one, which recommended a [ ] increase in the Secretariat's T/O. The October 1955 study of the feasibility of combining the Secretariat and the Signal Center came up with definitely negative recommendations, as did the July 1957 study of overtime practices and the February 1958 study of possible duplication in Cable Secretariat and Signal Center procedures. The April 1957 study of the Secretariat's manpower problem, although it recommended some minor administrative changes, produced nothing of real value.

One must conclude that [ ] had studied his own problems thoroughly and had put his own house in order. There was ample justification for the [ ] comment in his 12 August 1957 memorandum to [ ]

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25X1 We are pleased to report that in the conduct of this study, the Executive Assistant [ ] observed many management practices which were evidences of efficient and progressive executive performance on the part of the Cable Secretary.

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VII. New Technology in Cable Processing, 1957 - 1960

A. Early Developments

Needless to say, both the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center were constantly aware of the possibilities of applying technological advances to all phases of cable processing. As noted earlier, for example, with the sophistication of the teletype capability, the Signal Center had converted the Preliminary Dissemination system to Teletype Dissemination; and with the development of new applications of the basic offset printing process, the Secretariat had adopted offset for the reproduction of copies of incoming cables. During the 1957-1960 period this adaption of technological developments to cable processing became one of the major concerns of all Agency components involved in communications.

Some of the early adaptations of technology tended to create as well as solve problems. For example, in 1956 and 1957 the Signal Center converted the high-volume overseas signal centers from manual cipher to machine cipher, a change that greatly increased the

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transmission capability of the system. The effect on the Cable Secretariat, however, was quite different. Under the manual system the Signal Center had provided the Secretariat with offset multilith masters for incoming cables, and the Secretariat simply used the masters to reproduce distribution copies; under the machine cipher system the Secretariat got raw teletype copies of the machine-deciphered cables, and these had to be edited and retyped on offset masters before distribution copies could be prepared -- a considerable addition to the Secretariat's workload.

While the Secretariat was still developing ways to absorb this additional burden, the DDP records integration system was undergoing technological changes; and in the fall of 1957  the assistant Executive Officer of the DDP, asked the Secretariat to provide DDP cable originators and action units with a special records integration (RI) copy of each cable -- both outgoing and incoming -- in addition to the standard distribution. This the Secretariat did. The RI copies made a significant improvement in the indexing of cables, but it also put another burden on the Secretariat.

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Not only did some of the applications of technology -- like the Signal Center's machine cipher system and RI's indexing system -- create peripheral problems, but also some of the attempts to apply technology were fruitless. As early as October 1954

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[ ] then the deputy Cable Secretary, had suggested that the Secretariat's typing, proofreading, and duplication chores might be drastically reduced by the adoption of flexowriters. In January 1955 the Office of Communications rejected the proposal

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as being impractical. [ ] did not give up the idea, however, and in September 1955 he visited the cable processing center at the Department of State and learned that the use of flexowriters was -- contrary to OC's judgment -- quite practical. State had developed a method whereby reproducible masters could be derived semi-automatically through the use of teletype tapes and Friden flexowriters. This had required some changes in cable format -- changes related to the transmission of digits and unusual words -- but it had worked.

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[ ] discussed the new technique with [ ] agreed that it was worth a try.

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On 23 September 1955 [ ] proposed to the Director of Communications that he reconsider [ ] October 1954 suggestion and give the flexowriter system a trial run -- adding that if the trial was successful the Secretariat's typing staff could be reduced by one-half to two-thirds, which would mean a saving of as much as \$50,000 a year. 144/ On 4 October [ ] replied that he was agreeable to "modifying current message preparation procedures on a trial basis," 145/ and he directed his staff to make the necessary changes for a one-week test with [ ] station. He stipulated that at the conclusion of the test an evaluation would be made from a communications standpoint to determine whether or not the adoption of the procedure would result in a net saving to the Agency.

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The test was conducted during the week of 14 November 1955. The Secretariat had borrowed two flexowriters for the occasion; the machines were not expressly designed to use teletype tape, but they served the purpose. The Signal Center furnished the Secretariat with [ ] tapes of cables from [ ] during the week, [ ] of them were processed through the flexowriter, and the average time required for the preparation of masters was reduced from 12 minutes

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per cable to 6 minutes, a clear indication that the test had been successful -- as far as the Secretariat was concerned.

As far as the Signal Center was concerned, however, the trial run was a near disaster. [ ]

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[ ] transmissions were routed through the Army's radio-teletype network, and they reached the Signal Center in badly garbled condition; the Signal Center staff did its best to unscramble the garbles -- a time-consuming task -- but even then only [ ]

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[ ] tapes could be processed through the flexowriters in the Secretariat. On balance, the test run was a failure; it proved that the teletype tape-flexowriter could be effective only with accurate, ungarbled transmission of cipher text from the field to headquarters. The project was abandoned.

A year later, in November 1956, a second flexowriter experiment was launched -- this one in a sort of reverse direction. [ ], both advocates of the use of the flexowriter, proposed that Priority TD's and dispatches be originated on the flexowriter. The theory was that the clear-text tape generated could be used by both the Signal

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Center and RI. The proposal was accepted on a trial basis, but the Signal Center soon found that the tapes generated varied in format and were not accurate enough to meet the Center's rigid standards; that project, too, was abandoned.

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B. The [ ] Experiment

Although the two flexowriter experiments had proved to be failures, [ ] was still convinced that the machine could be useful in improving the Agency's communications system. In February 1959 he completed a paper, "Proposal for the Rapid Transmittal of Information Reports and Customer Reactions," and circulated copies among the Agency offices concerned with communications. The paper came to the attention of the DCI, who decided that it warranted serious consideration and assigned the job to a planning group that had been appointed late in 1958.

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The group, given the somewhat grandiose official title of "The Agency Planning Group for Mechanically Integrated Reporting and Communications System," was composed of 22 men. [ ] of the DDP was chairman; there were four other DDP members, including [ ] represented the Secretariat;

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and there were four DDI members, ten members from DDS components, and one representative from what was then the office of the Deputy Director for Coordination. 146/

25X1 The group met on 19 February 1959 to discuss the [ ] paper. What [ ] proposed was, in brief, 25X1 the establishment of a pilot model for a new field reporting system in which information reports would be originated in TD format using a flexowriter; the by-product tape would then be mechanically encrypted and pouched to headquarters, where it would be mechanically decrypted and turned over to the Cable Secretariat for processing on a flexowriter that was a twin to the one used in the field to originate the report. 25X1 [ ] proposed that [ ] station be used for the pilot project and that the experiment get under way as soon as possible -- he said that he 25X1 was prepared to go to [ ] immediately to set up the procedure so that the test could be in progress while the planning group was considering the other aspects of his proposal. The other aspects were those concerned with the various uses that headquarters components could make of the decrypted flexowriter tape after it arrived in the Secretariat.

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The planning group discussed the proposal at great length, each member raising questions about the impact of the system on his own particular component. At the end of the discussion it was agreed that the

[ ] pilot project be initiated as [ ] had proposed, and [ ] instructed the group's secretary, [ ] of the Office of the DDS, to draft a memorandum recommending to the Deputy Directors that the pilot project be approved. 147/ The Deputy Directors approved the recommendation, [ ] went [ ] and the [ ] project began on 25 March 1959. 148/

During the first six weeks of the trial run, only about 40 reports were transmitted from [ ] by the [ ] system, all of them dispatches. The Secretariat processed these on a borrowed flexowriter, and the system worked. [ ] original proposal provided for the Secretariat to process the tapes until the system became fully operational, after which the processing would be handled either by RID or the DDP operating divisions. By the end of June a total of [ ] had been sent [ ] The average transmission time, from typing [ ] to the automatic retyping in the Secretariat, was 4.9 days;

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and the total time elapse between origination in Munich and receipt at the desk of the DDI analyst was 7.2 days -- a vast improvement over the 54 days formerly required by the traditional pouch and manual reproduction and dissemination procedures.\*

In July the chairman of the planning group, [ ] sent to the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS a memorandum advising them that the preliminary trial run had shown that

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It is clear from the results of the [ ] test the [ ] system is feasible. From a technical point of view, the system works well and can be made to work even better. The results we hoped for can be attained or clearly could be attained. 149/

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[ ] said that the planning group recommended that the [ ] test link be continued and that additional links be established at [ ]

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The Deputy Directors promptly approved the recommendation, 150/ and the expansion of the [ ] system went forward. The Cable Secretariat continued to process the tapes until February 1960, and then the

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\* The 54-day figure was given in [ ] February 1959 [ ] proposal.

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responsibility was transferred to EE, WE, and FE divisions of the DDP. Since that time the system has continued as the major means of transmitting dispatch material.

C. Automated Cryptographic Transmission

25X1        Meanwhile, [ ] planning group had been working on another phase of technological development in communications. As noted earlier, an attempt to adapt the flexowriter technique to the reproduction and dissemination of mechanically decrypted cables had been a failure because of imperfections in the electrical transmission of mechanically encrypted cables. In December 1958 [ ] and his staff submitted to the newly formed planning group a comprehensive description of the Agency's communications system, including recommendations for improvement. 151/

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The major recommendation was for a program that would completely automate the cryptographic process. The program called for improved circuits and new equipment that would permit transmission of encoded cables at the rate of 100 words a minute, automatic decrypting without garbles, and production of a

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clear-text teletype tape that would serve as a master for reproduction of distribution copies. Such a system would relieve the Signal Center of the garble problem and the Secretariat of the reproduction problem.

The planning group recommended approval of the proposal, the DCI approved, the equipment was procured, and the program began to develop. The first new circuits to use the new equipment operated at only 60 words a minute -- neither the foreign telephone company relays nor the M-19 teletypes then in use could cope with the 100-word speed. By the end of 1960, however, the newer high-speed M-28 teletypes had been installed and the foreign relay capability had been improved; the system was operating at the 100-word-per-minute rate; 152/ and the cable processing in both the Signal Center and the Secretariat had been vastly simplified.

D. Improvement of TD Processing

In January 1958 the Cable Secretary had introduced a refinement in TD processing that later dovetailed neatly with the fully automated transmission of encrypted cables.  new procedure was

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relatively simple. By making some changes in the format of cables at the point of origin, the Cable Secretariat could provide the action unit with a teletype master in TD form, the area division reports officers could simply add [ ] numbers and the distribution information and return the master to the Secretariat, and the Secretariat could then use the master for the reproduction and dissemination of TD's. This procedure would virtually eliminate the typing of TD's by reports officers and would simplify TD dissemination. 153/

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[ ] proposal was approved, and on 10 March 1959 Helms, the DDP/COP, sent instructions to the field by book dispatch. 154/ The new system began early in April, and by the end of the month Helms sent another book dispatch to the field:

The new system for preparing and handling intelligence reports can already be set down as a definite success in most areas, even though the system is only a few weeks old. Cabled reports are, more and more, being disseminated exactly as you have written them. 155/

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VIII. Changes in Procedures and Organization,  
1959 - 1965

A. The Intelligence Watch\*

In February 1959 the Chief of the DDP Foreign Intelligence (FI) Staff proposed to the DDP/COP that a team of intelligence watch officers be organized to provide immediate processing and dissemination of the most urgent intelligence information cables -- at first during non-duty hours only and possibly, after a trial run, on a round-the-clock schedule. The purpose of the group would not be to duplicate the function of the regular cable duty officers but rather to provide the DDP area divisions and staffs with instant information.

The group would be composed of a chief, an administrative assistant, and six watch officers. It would be called the Intelligence Watch Officer Group (IWOG - later shortened to IW), and it would

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\* The development of the Intelligence Watch is discussed in detail in *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring, 1970, p. 37, "Rapid Transit in Clan-destine Intelligence." Much of the information in this section is based on that article.

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handle cables bearing IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY precedences and, when time permitted, selected ROUTINE cables. It would be a component of the FI Staff, but it would serve the entire DDP. Physically it was to be located as close as possible to the Cable Secretariat.

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The DDP approved the proposal, and by mid-1959 [ ] had been appointed chief of the group. [ ] who had served as deputy Cable Secretary from August 1952 to January 1954, had just returned from an assignment overseas at an FE Division post. [ ] his group, and the function of the group were welcomed by the Cable Secretariat, and after some complicated space manipulation on the top floor of Wing Two of L Building, space was arranged for them adjacent to, and with immediate access to, the Secretariat quarters.

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All of this took time, of course, and it was not until midnight on 5 February 1960 that the IW actually began operations. The procedure was the immediate release of intelligence information cables to the action unit and the simultaneous release of TD's to information addressees. From the outset, the IW used the device -- suggested by [ ] -- of

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eliminating the distribution to information recipients of cables that had been released as TD's. This practice avoided duplicate receipt of cable information by many recipients, and it also relieved the Cable Secretariat of a part of its responsibility for TD handling. The IW used new transmittal forms that notified TD recipients that there would be no additional cable distribution to them and notified action units if TD's were being suspended pending release by the action unit. The entire IW operation worked smoothly and integrated perfectly with Cable Secretariat procedures.

During March 1960, the IW processed  intelligence information cables during non-duty hours, and  of them were released as TD's. By May the IW non-duty hour operation had demonstrated that IW-released TD's could be processed for intelligence community distribution more rapidly than those referred to the operating divisions for release approval, and the IW function was extended to a 24-hour schedule.

In effect, the IW operation not only provided the DDP components with instant information --

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the original purpose -- but also it achieved a major improvement in the processing of TD's for distribution both inside the Agency and to the non-Agency members of the community. By the end of 1960, TD's\* were being disseminated to the community within a few hours after receipt at headquarters. During the first half of 1960 the average TD dissemination was

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It should be noted

that the IW operation was not solely responsible for the breakthrough in TD handling; field reports had improved in format, transmission and Signal Center processing had reached greater speed and accuracy, and the Secretariat had developed more rapid reproduction and distribution techniques. In any event, by the end of 1960 the TD system was in excellent working order.

B. TD Dissemination to the White House

In late April 1961, acting on instructions from

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\* In November 1959 the TD had been officially re-titled "Information Report" and thereafter bore that label when disseminated. Within the Agency, however, the TD name continued in use for some time.

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Helms, who was chief of DDP operations, [redacted]  
(chief of FI) and [redacted] met  
at the White House with Robert Komer of McGeorge  
Bundy's office. It seemed that Bundy, Special  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs, wanted to be provided with the more im-  
portant Clandestine Services information reports.  
Komer made it clear to [redacted] that Bundy  
didn't want all CS reports, just the more significant  
ones. In reporting the Komer discussion to Helms  
on 27 April, [redacted] said that it had been determined  
that only certain categories of reports would be sent  
to Bundy's office:

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25X1

25X1

A copy of whatever dissemination [redacted]  
of the Cable Secretariat provides to the DCI  
with an indication to the DCI that this par-  
ticular report has gone to Bundy.

25X1

A copy of the [redacted] [the disseminations by  
letter] that go to any member of the USIB by  
name.

The more significant disseminations made up  
from pouched reports which, if sent to Bundy's  
office, would also go to the Director's office.  
156/

[redacted] oncluded his report to Helms with the remark  
that because [redacted] had mentioned the new procedure

[redacted]

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Jack wanted me to equip you with this information so that you could mention it to the Director on Friday morning at the Staff Meeting, because Jack's notes show, he says, that the Director, after due consideration and discussion, had said send them "all" [redacted]

25X1

On 28 April the chief of FI [redacted] Reports Control sent to the DDP chief reports officers a memorandum informing them that dissemination to Bundy's office would not affect the reporting channel from OCI to Brigadier General Clifton in the White House, that they would recognize the Bundy disseminations by the symbol EXO/BUNDY, and that cable duty officers would be responsible for the actual dissemination. 157/ With the procedures established and the affected people informed, dissemination to Bundy began on Monday, 1 May 1961.

25X1

At that time and for about six months thereafter the TD's were delivered only during daytime on-duty hours. In October [redacted] was informed by FI [redacted] that a Mr. Debrevoise in Bundy's office had requested that deliveries be made on a round-the-clock, seven-day-a-week schedule. The day-time deliveries were to continue to be made to Bundy's Executive Office Building office, and after 1730 deliveries were to go to the Situation Room at the White House. 158/ Round-the-clock service began on 30 October 1961.

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C. Cable Processing

The two flexowriter experiments described earlier had failed largely because of technical imperfections in the transmission systems then in use. By the spring of 1960 the installation of new circuits and the complete automation of the ciphering system had corrected the imperfections, and most cables from the field were being received in a format that could go directly into the Secretariat's reproduction and distribution system. There was no longer a barrier to the use of the flexowriter for the automatic typing of masters of incoming cables. By this time, however, there had been new developments in the technology of copying, and the flexowriter was no longer the answer to the Secretariat's problem.

In early 1960 the Haloid Xerox Office Copier, Model 914, came on the market. 159/ In November 1959 the machine had been demonstrated at a business show in Washington; and [ ] had examined it and had decided that it was a piece of equipment that offered a breakthrough in cable processing. The Xerox copier not only produced copies automatically at a rate of six a minute but it also

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could make offset masters from a paper original -- masters that could be used in satellite reproduction and distribution centers, such as those in OCI and OCR, and were good for clear production of as many as 500 copies.

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As soon as the Xerox 914 was available for rental, [ ] chief of the Printing Services Division (PSD) of OL, to arrange for a 914 to be placed in the Secretariat.

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[ ] did this -- on a free-trial basis -- and the Xerox machine was installed in the Secretariat in March 1960. It was an instant success.

A rental contract was arranged, and by the end of July more than 50,000 masters and copies had been made on the 914. [ ] then arranged for the rental of a second machine to give the Secretariat a back-up capability that insured continuation of processing in the event of breakdown and during periods of preventive maintenance. The rental cost of the first machine had been absorbed by PSD, but on 1 July 1960 the Secretariat assumed the rental cost of the 914, in accordance with an earlier agreement between

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[ ], and for the second machine, which

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was delivered and installed in October.

The master-making capability of the Xerox 914 eliminated one of the most time-consuming chores in the Cable Secretariat -- the typing, proofing, and retyping of incoming cables. The process with the 914 was simple and fast. The teletype copy from the Signal Center was placed on a photo-trimmer, and the teletype heading -- of concern only to the Signal Center -- was cut off. Then the confirmation at the end of the page or the end of the cable was removed. The cable itself was then pasted on a cable form, using a continuation-page form if the cable ran more than one page, and the copy was then ready for the 914. The time required for the procedure was between 15 and 45 seconds, depending on the length of the cable.

From the original copy the 914 produced masters at the rate of five a minute, about 12 seconds for each. The old method had required about 12 minutes for the preparation of the copy for a master and about six minutes for the reproduction of each master. The 914 process was from five to six times as fast as the old method.

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The Xerox 914 could not, of course, absorb all of the typing and reproduction chores of the Secretariat. In January 1961 [ ] made a study of cable processing in the Secretariat. The study showed that 16 percent of incoming cables were received in the manual system in the Signal Center and had to be processed manually in the Secretariat; 5.5 percent were intelligence information cables on tapes pouched to headquarters, and the Secretariat processed the tapes; 27 percent were received in the machine cipher system from overseas stations not yet equipped with the automated high-speed equipment and still using the old cable format, which required manual processing; 51.3 percent of all incoming cables were processed on the Xerox 914. 160/ The study did not, of course, include the operations of the non-CIA cable branch in Q Building,\* which up to this point had been using the thermofax system for reproduction of non-CIA cables. In mid-summer of 1961, however, a third Xerox 914 and an offset press were obtained

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\* See below, p. 160.

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and placed in the Q Building branch.

Although the cost of using the Xerox equipment in cable processing was much less than that of any other known method, the increased use of the machines from 1961 to 1965 brought the annual cost of operation to about \$25,000 -- figure that suggested that the cost of outright purchase of the 914's might be less than the cost of rental. In January 1965 [ ] suggested this possibility to [ ]. The Xerox Corporation would sell new machines for \$29,500 or would sell the leased machines for less with full credit for rentals paid up to a limit of \$14,500. 161/

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[ ] and his staff considered the problem thoroughly and decided that it would be better to continue the rental; plans were made to revise the cable processing system, plans that might materially reduce the use of the Xerox, and besides, a new model of the 914 -- the 2400 -- was about to be put on the market. 162/ When, incidentally, the Xerox 2400 did come out later in 1965, the rental cost was too high to be justified by the benefits of the increased production speed, and [ ] stuck with the 914's.

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D. Cable Secretariat-OCR Cable Branch Merger1. Rationale and Procedure

As noted earlier, the processing and distribution of non-CIA cables had been assigned to the DDI Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) -- a logical assignment at the time because of the dissemination responsibilities of the office.

When OCD was reorganized and re-named the Office of Central Reference (OCR) in August 1955, the non-CIA cable function was retained. Because of the physical proximity of OCR to the other components of the DDI, this arrangement worked very well as far as OCI, ORR, and OSI were concerned. The DDP components, however, were located in the buildings along the reflecting pool, some distance from OCR, and the requirement for courier delivery delayed their receipt of non-CIA cables. In September 1960 [ ]

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[ ] a special assistant to Bissell, the DDP, approached [ ] with the proposition that the Secretariat take over the OCR cable branch and thus eliminate the delay -- the Secretariat was, of course, located within the DDP complex.

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[ ] agreed that the best way to get

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the proposition considered was first to advise

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[ ] so that the DCI would know what was going on and then refer the matter to the Management Staff for study. [ ] took care of informing [ ], and on

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6 October [ ] called [ ] and said that he thought that the Bissell proposal had some merit and that he was referring it to White, the DDS, for study by the Management Staff. [ ] that he would cooperate fully; but he also pointed out that because of the nature of the requirements governing the dissemination of non-CIA cables, he was not particularly interested in acquiring the function. 163/

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The Management Staff assigned [ ] to the study -- [ ] had done the two 1958 studies of the Secretariat staffing and overtime. After a preliminary look at the problem, [ ] came up with a statement that the purpose of the study would be to determine

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what effect the transfer of the non-CIA cable dissemination function to the Cable Secretariat would have on the speed of service to various Agency components, and whether the present dissemination system could be speeded up. 164/

In the section of his report dealing with "facts

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bearing on the problem" [ ] pointed out that the transfer would obviously speed up the delivery of non-CIA cables to the DDP but would slow down dissemination to other Agency components.

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The speed of delivery, however, was not the only factor to consider. [ ] study pointed out that the Agency would be in the new building within a year, that the transfer of the OCR cable branch would also have to be accompanied by the transfer of the RID element that disseminated non-CIA cables, and that immediate transfer would require additional Cable Secretariat space for [ ] persons and 26 safes in L Building, which was already badly overcrowded.

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Taking all of the factors into consideration, [ ] came up with the recommendation that physically the non-CIA cable function remain "in the OCR Cable Branch and the RID/[ ] until the move to the new building" and that administratively the function be transferred to the Secretariat in preparation for the physical merger at the time of the move. 165/

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## 2. The Non-CIA Cable Branch

The recommendation of the study was concurred in by Amory (the DDI), Bissell (the DDP), and [ ]

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(the EO/DCI); and on 5 February 1961 White (the DDS), issued an Agency Notice announcing the change in responsibility and setting the effective date as 22 January, with the physical merger of personnel, facilities, and records to be deferred until the move to the new building. 166/ By the end of February the non-CIA Cable Branch of the Secretariat was established in Q Building --  RID people had been transferred to the branch to complete the centralization of the function.

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There was an immediate speed-up in the delivery of non-CIA cables to DDP components -- largely through the use of Secretariat couriers in addition to the Agency couriers on which the OCR cable branch had depended -- and the speed of delivery to DDI components was maintained.

In March 1961 the total cable volume handled by the Secretariat, including the non-CIA branch, exceeded any previously recorded  This included a 44-percent increase in CIA cables and an 18-percent increase in non-CIA cables over the 1960 monthly averages. 167/

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The increase in the handling of non-CIA cables compounded an already difficult situation. The OCR

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and RID people now merged in the branch had been processing non-CIA cables for different customers and with different methods to meet different requirements. The former OCR people had to be re-trained to process cables to meet DDP requirements, and the former RID people had to adapt to the requirements of non-DDP components. At the same time, all of them had to change old methods to meet as far as possible the dissemination standards applied by the Secretariat to CIA cables.

In spite of the increased volume of non-CIA cables and the re-training problems, the branch succeeded in doing the job it was designed to do. On 30 March 1961 -- less than two months after the merger became effective -- the chief of WH Division, J. C. King, sent to the DDP a memorandum saying that "since the recent consolidation of the OCR and FI/ ☐ elements into the Cable Secretariat," dissemination of State and Defense cables to WH had been "speeded up from five and one-half and often more hours to an average of about one hour after receipt in the Agency." 168/ ☐ was informed of the WH memorandum and immediately passed the compliment on to the

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[redacted] of whom were women -- non-CIA cable branch in a memorandum addressed to [redacted]

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[redacted], chief of the branch, adding "My thanks to you and your office in making possible this improved service to WH." 169/

3. The Branch Move to the New Building

By the last week of September 1961 the new Headquarters Building had neared completion to the point that a number of DDI components were being moved into permanent quarters there.

Among the first elements to move was the CIA Watch of OCI and its production staff, one of the primary customers for non-CIA cables. To avoid an interruption of service, the non-CIA cable branch was moved to the new building at the same time. The Secretariat's permanent quarters were not yet finished, and the branch began operations in temporary quarters on the ground floor. Because the DDP components were not scheduled to move until several months later, three members of the branch, instead of going to the new building, moved into the Secretariat space in L Building and continued to service the DDP elements. This arrangement continued until March 1962,

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when the Cable Secretariat as a unit moved into permanent quarters in the new building.\*

E. Special Processing

1. DCI Selects

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On 1 December 1961 [ ] appointed [ ]

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[ ], who was the Executive Assistant to the DDCI, as the Cable Briefing Officer for the new Director, John McCone. 170/ This position had not existed before -- the function had been performed on

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an *ad hoc* basis by [ ]. New procedures

25X1

had to be devised, so [ ] began to provide the DCI, the DDCI, the DDP, and the CCP/COP books of cables arranged by geographic areas, each area group preceded by a summary page covering all of the cables in the group. Within each group the cables were arranged in the order of descending urgency -- a determination that was made by the cable duty officer, who also prepared the summaries. 171/

The same kind of book was prepared for non-CIA cables, using the same method of grouping and

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\* See below, p. 167.

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summarizing. Apparently the book device for handling DCI Selects was effective, for it has continued in use since that time.

2. State Cables

About two years after the change in the processing of DCI Selects, a major change was made in the processing of State Department cables. Until April 1963 State messages were delivered to the Agency in 17 copies. The non-CIA cable unit, both before and after its transfer to the Secretariat, prepared the copies for distribution. This process involved logging, handprinting the dissemination list on one copy for the files, handprinting a name and address on each of the other copies, and then sending the copies to the individual addressees; it was necessary to make additional copies if the dissemination list exceeded 16 addressees. In addition to the work involved there was the disadvantage of an addressee not knowing who the other addressees were -- often a source of confusion and misunderstanding.

In March 1963 this problem came to the attention of Lyman Kirkpatrick, then the Executive

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25X1 Director,\* and he asked [ ] to try to find a solution. [ ] solution was simple but effective; reduce the number of copies received from State from 17 to four, and the Secretariat would take care of the entire distribution in the Agency.

25X1 [ ] spelled out his proposal in some detail in a 19 April memorandum to Kirkpatrick, 172/ and Kirkpatrick approved. Paul Borel, the AD/OCR, made the necessary arrangements with State. Thereafter the Secretariat received four copies of State cables; two were sent immediately to the OCI duty officer, one was sent to the Secretariat duty officer to scan for DCI interest, and the fourth was processed for distribution copies -- each copy bearing a complete list of addressees.

F. Adjustment to the New Building\*\*

The Agency's master plan for the move into the new

\* In April 1962 the EO/DCI position held by [ ] was eliminated, and the position of Executive Director was created, with Kirkpatrick the incumbent [ ] (10 Apr 62). In May 1962 [ ] was appointed Inspector General, Kirkpatrick's former position [ ] (2 May 62).

\*\* The undocumented information in this section is based on Cable Secretariat Monthly Reports and on the recollections of the original author.

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Headquarters Building called for the Cable Secretariat, the Signal Center, and the Intelligence Watch to move simultaneously on 10 March 1962 -- as noted earlier, the non-CIA cable branch had moved into temporary quarters in the new building in September 1961, and on 1 March 1962 the branch moved into the permanent Secretariat quarters. The 10 March three-unit move had to be carefully coordinated and planned so that there would be no interruption of cable and TD processing at any time.

Before the move the Signal Center had installed duplicate equipment in its area of the new building and had arranged the circuits so that by throwing a series of switches cables could be received simultaneously at both locations.

The equipment and circuitry had been thoroughly tested, and the Signal Center was prepared to throw the switches immediately upon notification that the Cable Secretariat and the Intelligence Watch were shutting down and leaving for the new building. The move began on schedule at 0730 on 10 March. The Secretariat's area in the new building had been completely furnished and had been stocked with all necessary supplies, so within a few hours the Secretariat

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was doing business as usual. During these few hours, of course, Secretariat personnel were processing cables in the new building, using the non-CIA cable branch facilities and other pre-installed equipment. There was no interruption of service. The Secretariat's move was planned and managed by [ ]

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25X1

[ ], and he fully deserved the praise given him by the DDS. 173/

During the first month in the new building the Cable Secretariat processed a total of [ ] the second highest monthly volume recorded up to that time. New equipment and better work areas improved work-flow patterns and permitted efficient, high-volume production without overextending personnel.\* The new lounge area, equipped with basic kitchen equipment, had an excellent effect on employee morale, particularly that of the evening and midnight shifts. There were problems, however; some of them were minor and some major, but all of them required adjustment.

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For example, the conveyor system that had been installed between the Secretariat and the Signal

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\* By late 1963, however, it had become apparent that the Secretariat area needed renovation and change to improve operating efficiency. 174/ The work began in March 1964 and was finally completed in December.

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Center had proved to be totally unacceptable.

When it was tested before the two units moved into the building it seemed to have been designed for the movement of iron ore rather than pieces of paper.

It was removed before the Secretariat occupied the space; and until June 1962, when the pneumatic-tube system was installed, cable traffic had to be hand-carried between the Secretariat and the Signal Center. Even then, however, there were restrictions on the kinds of material that could be put into the pneumatic-tube system. These restrictions were relaxed somewhat after the adoption of a secure-mailing wrapper, but Top Secret documents still had to be hand-carried.

A more serious problem -- at least for several months -- was that of servicing the Agency components that had not yet moved into the new building. There were several of these in the buildings along the reflecting pool and the buildings in the old headquarters area on E Street. A part of the problem was handled by maintaining a satellite operation in a small office on the ground floor of L Building. The office was open from 0700 to 1700 on work days, and each morning at 0700 a Secretariat courier would

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deliver the overnight headquarters accumulation of cable traffic to the satellite office, where the components still located in the reflecting pool area would pick up their cables. At 1700 when the office closed, the day's take of outgoing traffic would be taken by courier to the Secretariat for processing. The E Street part of the problem was solved by establishing a courier schedule of four round trips each day between headquarters and the E Street buildings. As the DDP components moved into the new building the entire problem disappeared; those Agency elements that did not move were not major customers of the Cable Secretariat.

G. Records Management

In January 1963 the chief of the Signal Center,

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[ ] at the time, suggested that the Signal Center archives be moved to the Cable Secretariat, and the Director of Communications asked the Records Management Staff to make a study of the possibility.

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[ ] knew of the proposal, of course, and on 8 February -- even before the study got under way -- he made his position clear to Kirkpatrick:

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I would like to be on record that I do not want these archives; however, it is quite possible that the best place for them is in my office. 175/

The Records Management Staff study was completed on 3 April 1963, and the report was put into coordination channels. By 16 May the coordination was completed, and [ ] sent the report along to Kirkpatrick under a memorandum that indicated concurrence with report's recommendations -- which were, in effect, that the Signal Center archives be transferred to the Cable Secretariat and that the transfer be effective on 1 July 1963. 176/

[ ] had concurred in the recommendation, but in a 17 May memorandum to Kirkpatrick he listed five provisions qualifying his concurrence. 177/ The provisions concerned, among other things, responsibility for evaluation of cables for permanent retention, the transfer of personnel from the Signal Center to the Secretariat, and the provision of equipment. Kirkpatrick approved the recommendations of the study and agreed with [ ] qualifications, and on 1 July 1963 the archives were officially transferred to the Cable Secretariat. Included in the transfer were [ ] people and their positions -- [ ] archives assistants

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and one archives clerk. At that time, in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Records Management Staff report, the name of the archives was changed to "The CIA Cable Reference File." Lack of space prevented the immediate physical transfer of the function, but by September space was available, and the physical transfer took place.

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IX. Management and Administration, 1960 - 1965

A. Management Methods

1. The Cost Criterion

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[ ] was a pre-McNamara advocate of using the cost-effectiveness criterion in the evaluation of government operations -- at least the operations of the Cable Secretariat. Although cost-effectiveness was of interest to [ ] supervisors and was reported to them, his major use of it appeared to be internal -- as a device to make the personnel of the Secretariat aware of how well they were doing. It should be noted, of course, that the Secretariat -- unlike most other Agency components -- was a production unit, and its output could be measured specifically in terms of the number of cables processed during any given period of time. Thus the nature of the operation lent itself neatly to the cost-effectiveness concept. In any event, [ ] used the cost factor, and his employees' awareness of it, as a management tool.

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The first of the reports on the cost of processing cables in the Secretariat covered the six-month period from 14 June to 12 December 1959. The report covered all costs directly attributable to Secretariat operations -- salaries, insurance, retirement, travel, supplies, equipment, equipment rental, printing services, and the like. The report showed that during the six-month period the cost per cable was \$2.435.\* A second report covering the next six-month period, from 13 December 1959 to 11 January 1960, showed the cost per cable to have been \$2.438. Later, after the merger with the OCR and IR non-CIA cable units, the reports were done on a fiscal-year basis and arrived at a cost-per-cable figure combining CIA and non-CIA cable processing. These fiscal-year reports also developed productivity-per-person figures.

Bar-graph charts of the results of the cost studies were posted, new figures were added at the end of each fiscal year, and Secretariat employees always had a measure of the effectiveness of their performance. For example, they could see that in

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\* All reports on "Cable Secretariat Operations Costs" are available in the files of the Cable Secretariat.

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fiscal year 1960 the total of cables processed was

[ ] the cost per cable was \$2,436; the T/O was

[ ]; and the productivity was [ ] cables

per position. In fiscal year 1965 the total cable

volume had risen [ ] the cost per cable had

been cut to \$1.54; the T/O had increased to [ ]; and

the productivity per position had increased to [ ]

cables.

## 2. Staff Meetings

Perhaps the best analysis of [ ] managerial style is that written by his deputy in September 1970:\*

[ ] never lost an opportunity for involving his staff in the Cable Secretariat's policies, procedures and problems. He believed that all problems could be resolved by team work of the people most concerned, once they became involved; that communication must go both ways -- up and down; that those who supervise should reflect an awareness of what the workers want from their leaders -- understanding and appreciation of the work being done, and a willingness to throw a little weight at the workload, rather than at people. He made his views known to his Senior and Junior supervisory staff; that he expected them to communicate with the people they supervised; that they abide by the same rules and regulations that the employees were expected to observe; that they give prompt consideration to grievances,

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\* The analysis was written by [ ] who was the author of the four-volume first draft of this historical paper.

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and that every employee be treated with consideration and with respect. He encouraged the staff to discuss the problems of their people and to try to arrive at a satisfactory solution before passing the problem to the Front Office.

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[ ] not only preached this managerial philosophy; he also practiced it. Each month he held what was called a "combined staff meeting," which was attended by supervisory representatives from each of the three shifts and by three or four non-supervisory workers -- clerks, typists, press operators, and couriers. Everyone was given an opportunity to speak freely on any problems of procedure or policy and to offer suggestions of how working procedures or conditions could be improved. No suggestion was dismissed out of hand; a team of three people was appointed to study each suggestion and make a report of the conclusions -- a recommendation for adoption, modification, or rejection -- and give the reasons for the recommendation. [ ] called this procedure "The Cable Secretariat Management Review." It proved to be a very effective way of involving, at one time or another, almost all people at all levels in the problems of the Secretariat.

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### 3. Other Management Methods

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At a "combined staff meeting" early in 1958 [ ] suggested the publication of an office newspaper; he pointed out that the three-shift operation of the Secretariat tended to segment the staff and that a news bulletin of some kind might be effective in creating a sense of unity. His suggestion was studied by one of the three-man teams; it was approved and on 4 April 1958 the first issue of *Cable Secretariat Comments* was published. It was a six-page mimeographed paper containing a statement of the objectives of the publication, a "meet-the-boss" article describing [ ] background and experience, items of information about the development of plans for the new Headquarters Building, and a page of humorous cartoons related to the day-to-day activities of the office. The paper was an instant success within the Secretariat and even attracted the attention of [ ], the EO/DCI, who asked to be put on the distribution list -- a request that was reported in the second issue of the twice-monthly publication.

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One of the problems of managing an office that operated 24 hours a day seven days a week was that of

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developing a means of performance evaluation that would ensure fair recognition of the performance of those people who worked the evening and midnight shifts and thus were not often directly observed by front-office management. To do this, [ ] established specific performance standards for those jobs that were measurable in terms of average production and average rates of error. These were keyed to the standard fitness report performance ratings -- weak, adequate, proficient, strong, and outstanding. In that way performance could be evaluated not only on the basis of a supervisor's judgment but also on the mathematical score determined by the application of the performance standards to the individual's production record. This procedure went into effect in 1963, and in February 1964 the first Quality Step Increase (QSI) granted in the Cable Secretariat was awarded to [ ] a GS-08 cable analyst, on the basis of his work in exceeding the norms established by the performance standards. During 1964 and 1965, QSI's were awarded to 16 Cable Secretariat employees, about equally divided among the three shifts, in positions ranging in grade from GS-05 to GS-13.

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The volume of cable traffic in the Secretariat was always rising, and [ ] was constantly looking for new, faster, and less costly methods of cable processing. True to his philosophy of management, he centered his search in the Secretariat itself. In a November 1963 memorandum addressed to all Secretariat personnel he announced

. . . an intensive program for implementation in 1964 in which we plan to examine many of our practices and procedures and to effect improvements wherever possible. The objectives of this review are to improve the quality of our product, to reduce unit cost, to reduce our processing time and to improve working conditions. 178/

The memorandum made it clear that all functions of the Secretariat were targets for improvement, but a list attached to the memorandum identified 27 specific procedures that were prime candidates. The program produced a great many suggestions, and several of them were implemented -- for these the originators were rewarded through the Agency Suggestion Award Program. For example, a substantial cash award was given to an employee who suggested new procedures for logging and filing non-CIA cables -- procedures that eliminated needless filing space and folders, speeded up processing, facilitated destruction of obsolete material, and dovetailed with procedures for filing CIA cables.

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B. Changes in Agency Authority and Organization

Since the beginning of Cable Secretariat operations, procedures for the dissemination of cables within the Agency were based on the requirements of organizational components and the preferences of the people who headed those components.

Each change in Agency organization and each change in high-level administrative officers required several changes in dissemination procedures. As noted earlier, on 1 January 1959 Richard Bissell had succeeded Frank Wisner as DDP, and there had been changes in cable dissemination to the DDP. From that time until 29 November 1961, when John McCone succeeded Dulles as DCI, there had been no major organizational changes and no changes in senior officials.

Thereafter, however, through the spring of 1962, the changes came in rapid succession. This, of course, was during the period that the DDP components were moving into the new building; the Secretariat was deeply involved in adapting dissemination procedures to the moves and at the same time was altering procedures to meet the requirements of these changes in Agency organization and command: 179/

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- 27 Dec 61 -- C. P. Cabell resigned as DDCI, effective 31 Jan 62.
- 17 Feb 62 -- Richard Helms succeeded Richard Bissell as DDP. Thomas Karamessines became Acting DDP/COPS.
- 19 Feb 62 -- Deputy Directorate for Research (DDR) established; Herbert Scoville named DDR.
- 9 Mar 62 -- Marshall S. Carter appointed DDCI, succeeding Cabell.
- 19 Mar 62 -- Thomas Karamessines named DDP/COPS. (Position re-titled Assistant DDP on 1 May 62.)
- 30 Mar 62 -- Robert Amory, DDI, resigned from Agency; Huntington Sheldon named Acting DDI.
- 1 Apr 62 -- Offices of General Counsel, Legislative Counsel, and Comptroller moved from DDS to Office of the DCI. John Bross succeeded Edward Saunders as Comptroller.
- 10 Apr 62 -- Position of EO/DCI eliminated and position of CIA Executive Director established; Lyman Kirkpatrick incumbent.
- 15 Apr 62 -- Elements of DDP Development Projects Division (DPD) moved to DDR. 180/
- 16 Apr 62 -- R. Jack Smith named Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, succeeding Huntington Sheldon.
- 23 Apr 62 -- Ray Cline named DDI; Huntington Sheldon named Assistant DDI.
- 2 May 62 -- John Earman named Inspector General, succeeding Lyman Kirkpatrick.

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C. Administrative Reviews1. Staffing Complement, 1962

25X1 While the Cable Secretariat was involved in the complicated adaption of cable dissemination procedures to the changes in Agency organization and command, [ ] was wrestling with another problem -- that of staffing the Secretariat to meet the production requirements. In his 11 April monthly report, the last to go to the EO/DCI -- thereafter they went to the Executive Director, Kirkpatrick -- he pointed out that his T/O was five persons short of the

25X9 authorized [ ] positions.

25X9 In his monthly report covering operations in May he told Kirkpatrick that he was preparing a proposal to revise the Secretariat T/O by adding some new positions and upgrading some slots. On 12 August he submitted the proposal along with a memorandum that said that he was proposing a ceiling change from [ ] positions, a change that "is in line with the T/O approved in 1955 -- [ ] picked up when we took on the dissemination of non-CIA cables." 181/ The memorandum also stated that [ ] was asking for the upgrading of a number of positions below the GS-12 level.

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and CIA cable processing and the establishment of full-time chief and deputy chief positions in the Message Center for each of the three shifts. On 20 September [ ] report was sent to the DDS by the Director of Personnel, then Emmet D. Echols, with the recommendation that the proposed "revision to the staffing complement of the Cable Secretariat-Message Center be approved (Tab A), [\*] and that the personnel ceiling be increased from [ ] commensurate with the present authorized position strength." 183/

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The DDS, White, approved the recommendation but noted that "DD/S is without authority to approve ceiling increase. This matter should be resolved with the Comptroller." 184/ This meant another memorandum had to be sent to the Comptroller, which it was on 27 September. 185/ The Comptroller, John Bross, approved the recommendation on 5 October, 186/ but it appeared that he, too, lacked authority to approve ceiling increases; and on 8 October Bross sent the recommendation to the DDCI, Carter, indicating

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\* Tab A was the standard T/O form showing the position title, the position number and grade, and the number of people in each position; for example, Watch Officer, GS-0132.07 - 12, (9), which meant that nine people would occupy positions as GS-12 Watch Officers.

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Comptroller concurrence and recommending DDCI approval. 187/ Carter approved on 10 October, 188/ and on 15 October [ ] received a copy of Form 261, which established his T/O at [ ].

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2. The IG Survey, 1963

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In late October 1963 Earman, then the Inspector General, called [ ] and told him that the IG Staff was about to make a routine inspection of the Cable Secretariat. [ ] assured Earman of his full cooperation. The IG survey was completed near the end of November, and on 23 December Earman sent the survey report to Carter with a covering memorandum in which he said:

The Cable Secretariat is a tightly organized office which provides, under demanding standards of timeliness and security, dissemination of communications to Agency command and working levels and to other agencies and departments. The Cable Secretariat has met its mission so successfully that our recommendations are peripheral to its primary functions.  
189/

Attached to Earman's memorandum was a memorandum prepared for Carter's signature and addressed to the Cable Secretary requesting that within 30 days he furnish a summary of action taken on the recommendations of the IG survey report.

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On 17 January 1964 [ ] submitted to the DDCI the requested summary, saying that with the exception of recommendation number six he had taken positive action on all of the IG's recommendations. 190/ Recommendation number six was the elimination of individual production reports, which the inspectors had found to be an irritant to the people who were required to submit them. In the comments that accompanied his memorandum to the DDCI, [ ] said,

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I am not at this time in agreement with the Inspector General's views on the premise that the production reports are of considerable value to me in my management of the Cable Secretariat.

Apparently [ ] dissent was effective, for on 19 March 1964 he received from Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director-Comptroller (ED-C),\* a memorandum telling him that "the recommendations contained in the Inspector General's survey report on the Secretariat are approved with the exception of recommendation #6 which is disapproved."

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\* On 18 November 1963 the Office of the Comptroller became a part of the Office of the Executive Director, and the Executive Director became the Executive Director-Comptroller. The change was announced by [ ] 26 November 1963.

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The final paragraph of the ED-C's memorandum said,

This Inspector General survey confirms the outstanding manner in which you are administering the Cable Secretariat, and I personally commend you and your staff for an exceptionally fine Inspector General's report.

3. Staffing Complement, 1964

One of the "exceptionally fine" aspects of the IG's report was a section that put into  hands a lever with which to raise his staffing complement. Because the section that did that is a revealing analysis of the condition of the Cable Secretariat at the end of 1963, the full text is given here:

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While the presently rising volume can be expected to level off eventually, there is no indication that this will be in the foreseeable future.

This continual rise in the volume of work will inevitably confront the Cable Secretary with the problem of determining the extent to which additional personnel are needed. This is not a problem that he can control, as his work is the result of the activities of others. His organization must process what comes to it. Under present conditions there is little if any slack in the Secretariat. With it apparently becoming standard practice to carry an almost continual backlog under normal conditions, it follows that in time of crisis serious strains will be placed on the Secretariat's ability to fulfill its mission. In fact, it has been reported to the inspectors that during the

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Cuban crisis the Secretariat fell far behind in processing the heavy flow of traffic.

As the control point for the flow of critical information the Secretariat is an essential activity. Its operation with too small a margin in personnel strength could prove critical in future crises. At the time of the inspection the Cable Secretary was well along in the exploration of new equipment and the development of new procedures to increase the production capacity of the office. He was confident that over the next year these new programs will contribute to a significant increase in Secretariat productivity. We are impressed with the new programs, and with the Cable Secretary's evaluation of their potential, especially in view of his long record of success in such innovations in the past. However, we hold some reservations about the extent to which mechanical efficiency can continue to meet all the demands that may be placed upon the office. While we accept the Cable Secretary's evaluation at this time, we still feel that the entire problem of staffing should be reviewed after completion of the new steps, to determine the extent to which they meet all the demands levied upon the Secretariat.

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lost no time in applying the lever. On 13 January 1964 -- about two months before the recommendations of the IG's report were officially approved -- he sent to the Salary and Wage Division of O/Pers a memorandum in which he quoted the IG's comments on the staffing problem and requested that a review of the Secretariat's staffing complement be made before the end of 1964. 191/ The Salary and

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Wage Division complied with [ ] request, conducted the review, and submitted the findings on 11 December 1964. 192/

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The findings were something of a shock to [ ] either his lever had been limp, or he had used the wrong fulcrum. The Salary and Wage Division had made three recommendations:

- a. That the Records Management Staff be requested to make a full-scale study of the processing requirements of the Cable Secretariat;
- b. That immediate steps be taken to secure full staffing of the Cable Secretariat, including temporary authority to exceed current ceiling by three clericals, pending results of the Records Management study; and
- c. That failing to obtain additional personnel, a temporary staggering of hours for some of the second and third shift personnel, but that this should not be used as a final solution.

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[ ] could accept none of these recommendations. On 16 December 1964 he sent a somewhat indignant memorandum to Kirkpatrick. He pointed out that his operations had been thoroughly studied again and again, most recently by the IG Staff in December 1963, and he did not believe that another study was needed; he was convinced that the solution of his problem was revised procedures, more people, and full utilization of appropriate mechanical-computer equipment.

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He dismissed the suggested temporary staggering of work hours as not being feasible because of the consequences of disrupted households and a lack of public transportation and car pools. He said that the "taking of immediate steps to fully staff the Cable Secretariat" would be doing no more than the Office of Personnel had been trying to do for many months. He recommended to Kirkpatrick that

a. Our T/O be increased [ ]

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b. No further studies be made of the Cable Secretariat at this time.

c. I be directed to report on whether processing time and capabilities are improved when we have on hand [ ]  
(Note: it is not reasonable to expect to maintain a strength of [ ] in this unit -- to maintain [ ] people on hand, we need a T/O of [ ] in my opinion.) 193/

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Kirkpatrick approved [ ] recommendation

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for an increase [ ], but [ ] did not know it until early February 1965 when the DCI Administrative Officer forwarded to him a copy of a memorandum for the Director of Personnel on the subject of "Position Ceiling Change" dated 8 February 1965 and signed by the Management Control Officer. 194/

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The memorandum referred to   
16 December 1964 memorandum and stated that the  
Secretariat's new ceiling was  positions "per  
direction of the Executive Director-Comptroller."

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X. Growth and Change, 1965 - 1966

A. The Workload Problem

25X1 As [ ] had pointed out in his 16 December 1964  
memorandum to Kirkpatrick, an official T/O of [ ] 25X9  
positions did not necessarily mean that there would  
be [ ] people on board. Indeed, when the Secretariat  
25X9 had a T/O of [ ] positions, it was not possible --  
even with the earnest efforts of the Office of  
Personnel -- to fill all of them. The February 1965  
25X9 increase from [ ] was of benefit to the Sec-  
retariat only because it increased the recruiting  
requirement and thus increased the possibility of  
getting more people on board.

25X9 By May 1965 more positions had been filled, but  
the Secretariat was still nine persons under the  
authorized ceiling [ ] and it was in  
May, immediately after the crisis in the Dominican  
Republic, that the Secretariat set a new high monthly  
25X1 record [ ] units processed and another new  
25X1 record for cables processed during one 24-hour  
period -- [ ] 195/ Largely because of the

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shortage of personnel the Secretariat was forced to increase its monthly average of overtime use by 385 hours.

Fortunately the workload of the Secretariat had been reduced somewhat in February 1965 when a new pneumatic tube, called the "purple tube," was installed to permit transmission of cables directly from the Secretariat to the Operations Center. Before that time the pneumatic tube system could be used only during day-time hours, and at all other times cables had to be hand-carried. Because the "purple tube" linked only the Secretariat and the Operations Center, there were no security restrictions on its use, and all cables -- including TS -- could go through the tube.

During the summer of 1965 the shortage of personnel in the Secretariat was relieved temporarily by the use of summer employees. The Agency's summer employee program -- the temporary employment of the sons and daughters of Agency employees -- had been in existence for several years, but because of the sensitivity of the work of the Secretariat  had not used the program. In May 1965,

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however, he decided that summer employees could be used, and he requested that eight of them be assigned to him. 196/ His request was approved by the ED-C and the Director of Personnel, and in June the summer employees came on board. Because none of them had TS security clearance, it was necessary to establish special procedures in their duty assignments, but by the end of the summer it was clear that the special treatment had been worth the effort. In his monthly report for September  said:

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All of them performed their duties to the full satisfaction of this office. They were of tremendous help to the Cable Secretariat and I would be happy to recommend any one of them for permanent assignment to the Agency.

B. Procedural Changes

1. The Direct-Image System

A breakthrough of a kind in the processing of cables had been made by the Cable Secretariat in March 1960 when the Xerox 914 was installed it eliminated the tedious process of making masters by typing, proofing, and retyping.\* By the

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\* See above, p. 154.

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beginning of 1965 the Xerox equipment was still useful, but it was clear that the procedures for the use of it could be considerably simplified. The major problem was that the Secretariat received cables from the Signal Center on white teletype rollpaper, which had to be cut and mounted and then fed into the Xerox for the making of a master.

By February 1965 the Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat, working together, had devised a method of using offset master material instead of the standard rollpaper in the teletype machines; the offset master was then produced by the teletype machines themselves, and there was no need for cutting and mounting and using the Xerox for production of a master. The new process was called the "Direct-Image Teletype Master System."

Although the cost of the offset master material was slightly higher than that of the standard rollpaper, it was more than justified by the overall reduction in the cost of processing cables -- the cost in March 1965, the first full month when the new system was in use, was \$1,961 lower than the cost in January 1965 -- and by the reduction in the

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Secretariat's processing time -- a decrease of 47 percent in processing immediate precedence items and 43 percent in processing priority messages. 197/ The new system did, however, have its drawbacks. The offset master material was sensitive to fingerprint marks and grease, and it tended to curl at the edges, which caused some trouble in the offset presses.\* On balance, however, the direct-image system was definitely superior to the old method.

## 2. Color Standardization

Another improvement in cable processing was made in March 1965. Over the years the Secretariat had been using five different colors of paper in reproducing cables. Each incoming message required three different colors -- yellow to the action unit, green to the RI files, and white to all other recipients. Each outgoing message required two colors -- blue to the RI files and pink to information recipients. The use of the different colored paper required that the high-speed, semi-

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\* In early 1967 these disadvantages were eliminated by re-engineering the teletype machines -- "stunting," it was called -- so that they printed page-size texts on fanfold paper, thus providing a master in pre-printed cable form. 198/

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automatic reproduction equipment had to be stopped frequently to change from one color paper to another; this meant that the equipment could not be operated at or near capacity. With the Secretariat T/O still unfilled and cable volume increasing steadily, even small improvements were important; and [ ] saw in the multi-colored-paper procedure a chance for a small improvement.

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On 18 March 1965 [ ] attended a DDP staff meeting and recommended that the Secretariat drop the use of different colored paper and reproduce only white copies. He pointed out that the change would reduce from 21 to 10 the steps necessary in the reproduction of cables. 199/ The members of the DDP staff accepted all but one part of [ ] proposal; they insisted that outgoing cables continue to be reproduced on pink paper. [ ] was quite willing to compromise, and thereafter only white and pink paper was used in the processing of cables -- a definite improvement over the old method.

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### 3. Publication of Confirmations.

An improvement of somewhat greater magnitude came in July 1965. Up until that time incoming

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cables repeated ("confirmed") critical parts of messages -- names, dates, times, numerals, and the like -- at the end of the message. The Signal Center and the Cable Secretariat were responsible for cross-checking the confirmation with the body of the cable to insure clarity and accuracy, and then the Secretariat deleted the confirmation before the cable was reproduced and disseminated. The cross-checking was a tedious process; Secretariat and Signal Center personnel could not be familiar with the background of most of the confirmation material, and much of their time was used in unnecessary cross-checking.

On the other hand, the cable addressees were familiar with the situations, events, and people referred to in the cables and were much better qualified to check confirmations for accuracy. After some unofficial coordination with the Secretariat's major customers [ ] announced on 6 July 1965 that as of that date all incoming messages -- except Intelligence Reports -- would be disseminated with the confirmation portion included, just as the cable was received. 200/

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4. Revision of TD Processing

Perhaps because Intelligence Reports -- still referred to internally as TD's -- were disseminated to other members of the intelligence community, special care was taken to produce copies of high quality. Cables reproduced for Agency dissemination were processed on Xerox equipment; but the Xerox copies were not always up to the TD quality standards, and the flexowriter was used for TD's. This required that the Secretariat convert the punched paper teletype tape, supplied by the Signal Center, to a direct-image master for use on the flexowriter. It took about 20 minutes to process the average TD; if three TD's were received for processing at the same time, the third would be delayed for about an hour before it got into dissemination channels. In August 1965

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proposed that the format for TD reporting from the field be modified so that the addition of paste-on headers would enable the Signal Center tape to serve as a master for the flexowriter processing. 201/ The proposal was approved by the DDP, the instructions for format changes were sent to the

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field, and by April 1966 the new procedure was in operation. 202/

5. Purge of the Pseudo/Crypto Files

During 1965 there was another change in cable processing procedures -- one that warrants mention even though its direct effect on the Secretariat's operations was not a major one. As noted earlier, the Secretariat maintained a listing of all pseudonyms and cryptonyms that might be expected to appear in cable traffic. This list was used by the cable duty officer when he selected messages for the DCI's information. He would prepare a "breakout slip" giving the true identities of the pseudonyms and the spell-out of the cryptonyms in a message, and the breakout slip would be attached to copies that went to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDP, and the ADDP -- any one or all of whom might not be familiar with the pseudonyms and cryptonyms used.

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In March 1965 Helms, then the DDP, told  that he was somewhat concerned about the fact that the breakout slips often identified specific sources when such identification was not necessary. Helms believed that a descriptive device would serve

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the purpose of the breakout and would avoid specific identification. [ ] agreed with Helms, and soon thereafter the DDP began a thorough review of the Secretariat's pseudo/crypto list. In a 9 April memorandum to Kirkpatrick [ ] reported that

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Karamessines had detailed two DDP employees to review each identity, with the objective of substituting where appropriate a descriptive identity which will not pinpoint an individual . . . . The idea is that the identity would meet the needs of the DCI equally well as the present system and better protect the identity of the source. 203/

As an interim measure while the purge of the files was in progress, the cable duty officers were requested to "use their good judgment and wherever possible furnish a breakout which does not pinpoint a particular individual." 204/ The review of the files was completed in October 1965. In his monthly report covering October, [ ] so informed the ED-C, adding that Karamessines had instructed the DDP divisions and staffs to avoid the need for a repetition of the purge exercise by providing the Cable Secretariat with descriptive identities of new pseudonyms and informing the Secretariat when pseudonyms and cryptonyms became inactive.

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C. Requirements of the New Command

In the spring of 1965 there were changes in the top command of the Agency and of the DDP that had major effects on the operations of the Cable Secretariat. On 28 April Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., replaced McCone as DCI, and Richard Helms was moved from his position as DDP to the DDCI position, replacing Carter, who then became Director of the National Security Agency. At the same time, Desmond Fitzgerald was appointed DDP to succeed Helms. Karamessines remained in the position of ADDP. 205/ For some months, while the new command was getting settled the processing of cables continued without major change, but by September things began to happen.

1. The DDP Duty Officer Staff

Since the beginning of the Cable Secretariat operation in 1952, the Secretariat duty officers had been known as CSDO's and were so designated in cable handbooks and cable regulations. When the DDP created the Clandestine Services duty officer position in January 1953, the CSDO term happened to fit that position also. This dual application of the

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
term created no confusion over the years simply because the Secretariat duty officers also served as Clandestine Services duty officers. The Secretariat staff was a bit dismayed, therefore, when on 23 September 1965 the DDP issued Clandestine Services

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[REDACTED], which stated that henceforth the CSDO designation would be used only to identify

the Clandestine Services Duty Officer, who

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number of responsibilities and authorities, some of them new and some of them formerly in the province of the Cable Secretariat and the Operations Center Senior Duty Officer:



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In effect the CS notice relegated the Cable Secretariat duty officers to a support role -- with their designation reduced to CDO. They were to continue to support the SDO and the Intelligence Watch (IW) Staff, and in addition they were to provide the major support for the CSDO staff. By sheer happenstance the date of the CS notice, 23 September 1965, was the day that India and Pakistan momentarily halted fighting over Kashmir in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution and later in the day broke the cease-fire agreement and resumed heavy fighting. These events created a sudden swell in cable traffic, and during the remainder of September the Cable Secretariat duty officer staff was faced with the problem of carrying out normal duties --

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vastly increased in volume

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In addition, of course, the CDO's had to provide support for the newly established CSDO function. The CSDO staff had neither cable reference files nor pseudo/crypto files, and the CDO's had to provide copies of referenced cables and identities of pseudonyms and cryptonyms for virtually all the cables handled. Eventually of course, the problems were solved, and the CSDO and CDO systems adjusted to normal operating procedures.

## 2. Briefing the DCI

One of these procedures was the briefing of the DCI. During his tenure as Director, McCone had preferred to use a special assistant in his own office as a cable briefing officer; the special assistant was fully briefed on the over-night cable traffic by the SDO and the Cable Secretariat duty officer. When Raborn succeeded McCone, the method was changed. Raborn usually arrived at his office by 0615 hours each morning, and he wanted an immediate briefing on the night's cable take. The

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SDO and the CSDO, both of whom had been on duty during the night, were the logical briefers -- until September 1965 the CSDO was the Cable Secretariat duty officer wearing his second hat. After the CS notice set up the CSDO system, the CDO helped the SDO and the CSDO prepare for the briefing, and each morning just before 0600 they would check with the CDO for late messages that might be of interest to the DCI.

The DCI briefing routine started when the on-duty security officer called the Operations Center and told the SDO and the CSDO that the Director had entered the building. They timed their arrival at the DCI's office to coincide with his, and the briefing began as the Director sat down at his desk. The SDO opened with non-covert and special intelligence information that had come in during the night; the CSDO followed with coverage of significant Clandestine Services matters. By working agreement between the two briefing officers, if the CSDO considered any part of his briefing to be operationally sensitive, he would signal the SDO, who would then leave the room -- the SDO, of course, was not a DDP officer and thus was not privy to

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sensitive operational intelligence. During the briefings, which usually lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, the Director listened and ate his breakfast; the atmosphere was informal and relaxed, but there was no time wasted in idle conversation.

When Helms became DCI at the end of June 1966, the early-morning briefings were dropped. Helms preferred to be briefed by his Deputy Directors during his daily meetings with them at 0900. The change meant that the SDO briefed the DDI, and the CSDO briefed the DDP before the morning meeting, and the CDO supplied both briefers with the latest incoming information right up to the time of the briefings -- usually at 0800.

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### 3. The [ ] Committee Reviews

In early 1966 the Secretariat was still adjusting to the change introduced by the DDP's establishment of the new CSDO system, when another major change came as a result of the requirements of the new command. Raborn made it clear that he did not like the lack of uniformity of format in the cables that came to his desk. The "lack of uniformity" had been intentionally developed over the years as an effective method of making instant

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identification of the various categories of cables -- there were five or six categories determined by such factors as degree of sensitivity, types of distribution, required operational action, administrative response, and the like. The DCI's preference had to be considered, however, and on 2 March 1966 Colonel White,\* the ED-C, appointed a committee to study the possibility of establishing a uniform format for all cables. 206/

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[ ] Director of Communications, was named chairman of the committee, and there were eight members -- two each from the DDP, the DDI, and the DDS; one from the DDS&T; and one [ ] from the Secretariat.

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The committee met on 11 March and several times during the next ten days, and on 22 March the secretary of the group submitted to [ ] a draft of its recommendations. 207/ By 29 March the draft had been put into the shape of a final report that was submitted to White for approval. 208/ Attached to the report were drafts of the headquarters and field regulations that would implement the actions recommended by the committee.

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\* White succeeded Kirkpatrick as ED-C on 5 July 1965 [ ], 24 June 1965).

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The recommendations were broad in scope; they covered all outgoing and incoming cables -- including intelligence reports. In general, the recommended format changes were designed to establish a uniform pattern for all cables, the uniformity to be achieved by assigning to each of the first four lines of all cables a specific function and form -- classification, time of release, originator, references, precedence, information addressees, sensitivity indicators, project cryptonyms, and the like, all in predetermined order. The committee's recommendations were approved in April 1966, 209/ to become effective on 1 May -- the existing cable forms were to be used, but with the new format, until new forms specifically designed to fit the new format could be printed and distributed.\*

Although the work of the [ ] committee had satisfied the DCI's desire for uniformity in the format of cables, it had not considered another factor that concerned him -- probably because his

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\* A year later, on 6 April 1967, a revised edition of the Cable Handbook [ ] were issued, containing the new procedures.

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concern had not been known to the committee when they began their study in March. At some time in April the Director mentioned to the ED-C that some cables came to his desk without any indication of who else had received copies. He felt that he should have that information. White informed

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[ ] of the Director's remark, and on 15 April notified White that the committee had been reconvened to study the matter and also to consider another related matter -- the earlier committee study had revealed the fact that there was split responsibility in selecting cables for the attention of the DCI and other key officials in the Agency. 210/ In accordance with Headquarters

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[ ] the Cable Secretariat was responsible for DCI selects. Also, however, the SDO at the Operations Center reviewed all special intelligence messages and selected some for DCI attention, and he sometimes sent to the DCI advance copies of regular messages provided the Operations Center by the Cable Secretariat. Copies sent to the DCI by the SDO did not show distribution lists, and at times the SDO sent copies of the same messages that

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the Secretariat had selected for DCI attention.

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The [ ] committee soon came up with a proposal of procedures that would insure that copies of Agency and non-Agency cables selected for the DCI, the DDCI, and the ED-C would show internal Agency distribution, would eliminate duplicate distribution, and would insure that the Operations Center and the Cable Secretariat would know the criteria each other used in selecting cables for senior officials. The proposed procedures were approved and became effective on 25 April 1966 and were incorporated in the Cable Secretariat Standing

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[ ] as of that date. 211/

The new procedures retained the regulatory responsibility of the Secretariat duty officer for the selection and dissemination of cables for DCI attention, but they required that when the CDO sent advance copies of selected cables to the SDO, the CSDO, or other units he would indicate that the cable was a DCI Select. The new procedures also required that a distribution list appear on all copies of cables that went to the DCI. In addition there was the requirement that when the SDO, the CSDO, or any other official decided that the DCI

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should see a certain cable not selected by the CDO' he would request the CDO to send it, giving his reasons for the request. The new procedures were effective but they did place an additional burden on the Cable Secretariat -- a burden that gradually diminished as each of the authorized "selectors" became familiar with the criteria used by the others.

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XI. Summary and ConclusionsA. A Look Back\*

If one were to describe the CIA Cable Secretariat as the heart of the Agency, the analogy would not be too much overdrawn. To the extent that current information is the life blood of intelligence, the Secretariat's function has always been that of supplying the parts of the Agency body with the substance of life; and the supply system had to be fast, efficient, and continuous. Like any viable body, the Agency was always growing -- either in size or complexity of functions or both, and the Secretariat had to adjust to these changes and meet new requirements as they arose. More often than not, the new requirements were not accompanied by increases in the Secretariat's T/O. To meet them, then, there had to be a constant search for ways of improving procedures and a constant effort to apply

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\* This section was written by one who was not a member of the staff of the Secretariat. The conclusions and evaluations are based on a study of the four-volume original history of the Secretariat and on the impressions the writer gained during almost 20 years of service with the Agency.

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technological developments to cable processing. Over the years from 1952 through 1966 improvement of procedures -- by any and all possible means -- became the hallmark of the Secretariat.

Although a great many of the cable processing problems were solved by the adaption of sophisticated machinery as it became available, the richest source from which procedural improvements came was the Secretariat's own people. Not only were they thoroughly versed in the techniques of cable processing but also they were sincerely committed to the mission of the Secretariat. To a great extent this commitment was generated by their admiration and respect for the Cable Secretary, [redacted].

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[redacted] came to the Agency in response to the direct request of General Smith, then DCI. Smith wanted [redacted] because he was familiar with [redacted] work in military cable processing and he had confidence in [redacted] ability to establish and manage an Agency cable secretariat.

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The years have justified Smith's confidence. [redacted] quickly adapted his military experience to the new situation, he anticipated problems and found

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solutions before they became critical, and he grew as the Agency grew. He won and held the respect of his superiors, and he did it without compromising his own convictions; he never hesitated to voice opposition to proposals that he deemed unproductive, but he always had sound reasons for opposition.

Perhaps most important to the effective function of the Secretariat, he stood up for the people who worked for him, and he did whatever he could to promote their welfare. It was only fitting, therefore, that at the time of his retirement late in 1971 that [ ] was awarded the Agency's Intelligence Medal of Merit.

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B. A Look Ahead

Although the time span of this paper extends only through 1966, it seems appropriate here to identify the major development in the Secretariat during the period that followed 1966. This was the introduction of the automation concept. Actually the possibility of computerizing cable processing was being considered by [ ] as early as 1965. By that time it had become apparent that the mere improvement of procedures by the combined application of ingenuity and mechanical

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devices could not possibly keep pace with the increasing volume of cable traffic and the complexity of dissemination.

A 29 December 1965 memorandum for the record describes a conversation that [ ] had with White, then the ED-C. 212/ [ ] told White that the Army and the State Department message systems were being computerized, that he had examined the progress on them, and that he believed that the Cable Secretariat could automate. White agreed that the possibility should be explored, and [ ] memorandum was sent along to the Office of Computer Services (OCS) with the request that the problem be studied. OCS completed the requested study in April 1966. The chief of OCS, Joseph Becker, recommended to [ ] that the computerization of the Cable Secretariat be combined with that of the Signal Center. [ ] recommended to White that Becker's proposal be approved, and at the same time he recommended that the cable receiving functions of the Intelligence Watch and the DDP also be computerized. 213/ White approved both Becker's and [ ] recommendations and authorized [ ] to include a request for funds in his FY 1968 budget.

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[ ] did so. The budget request for the automation of the Secretariat was [ ] a figure based on the OCS estimate of cost. The request was included in the overall Agency budget request that was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB).

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On 28 November 1966 [ ] was informed that the BOB had removed the [ ]. The reason given was that the request was not supported by specifications concerning the items required and the timing of installation. In March 1967 [ ] reported to White that the BOB's reason was not a valid one and that he, [ ] intended to go ahead with specific planning on the assumption that funds would be made available in the FY 1969 budget. 214/

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Soon thereafter [ ], with White's approval, formed an Automated Communication Terminal (ACT) working group. It was composed of representatives of the Cable Secretariat, the Office of Communications, and OCS. The group began working on specifications and completed a first draft in June 1969. By that time [ ] had concluded that "we have a long way to go -- years, not months -- before automation is a fact in the Cable Secretariat." 215/ He was quite right. The ACT specifications were submitted

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to a firm of consultants, the [redacted] 25X1  
for an estimate of cost. On 18 July the estimate  
was submitted -- about [redacted] 25X1  
more than the budget allocation. The ACT program  
was then divided into three phases, the first for  
the Signal Center, the second for the Cable Secre-  
tariat, and the third for other elements --  
primarily the IW and the DDP cable receiving functions.

In June 1970 a contract for the first phase was  
let to [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] Specifica-  
tions for phase two were completed in January 1971,  
and on 14 February, the day before bids were to be  
solicited, the ED-C announced that phases two and three  
were put on indefinite hold pending completion of a  
study of the overall Agency computer program. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] of the Office of Program Planning and Budgeting  
was assigned to conduct the study. [redacted] staff  
immediately began to assemble a host of material for  
25X1 [redacted] to review; [redacted] assumed that because [redacted] 25X1  
knew nothing at all about the functions of the Sec-  
retariat he would spend at least several weeks  
learning something about 20 years of development in

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cable processing. Actually [ ] spent about two hours in the Secretariat. He completed his full report of computerization in the Agency in less than 60 days, and that part of his conclusions related to the Cable Secretariat recommended, in effect, that the Secretariat be abolished and its functions be scattered around among other Agency components.

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[ ] report was given to the Deputy Directors and the Cable Secretary as an oral briefing. He had no specific ideas about implementing his conclusions and recommendations; he said that such things were not his concern and another study would have to be made before anything specific could be done. "Another study" was not made, and computerization of the Cable Secretariat was in abeyance -- perhaps in limbo.

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\* Unless otherwise indicated, copies of all documents  
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
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
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